The Organizational Effectiveness View of the Total Organization

U.S. ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND

ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS CENTER AND SCHOOL

FORT ORD, CALIFORNIA
Perhaps the most difficult and complex organization to manage and lead is the military. Central to the successful leadership and management of the military organization is an understanding of the interaction of the systems that comprise the organization. To assist in the leadership and management of the military organization, and to develop a view of the complexities of the organization, an understanding of the systems-view of an organization is essential. To graphically portray the systems view of an organization, we have adapted and utilized the writings of F. E. Kast and J. E. Rosenzweig's *Organization and Management - A Systems View*.

On the front cover of the communique is a visualization of the total system and the continual, mutual, interaction of the subsystems in military organizations. This simple model places the *commander* in his appropriate role at the center of the subsystems. It is deliberately represented as superimposed over the other subsystems because this is the place of the commander and his management structure - linking and influencing all the subsystems. Surrounding the commander is the *chain of command* subsystem comprised of the subordinate officers, noncommissioned officers and, in many cases, the civilians who hold leadership positions within the organization. The largest subsystem of an organization is the *environment* or climate. It is here that one can sense higher headquarters influencing the organization. The installation, as well as the local community, are two other elements that contribute to and influence organizational life. All of the subsystems are susceptible to and influenced by the environment in which it finds itself. *Mission* represents another subsystem. Included in this subsystem are goals and values which make up an organization and determine what it is and does. The *structural* subsystem is made up of two groupings: formal reporting relationships, such as TO&E and TDA, and the informal relationships of personnel within the organization. The *personnel* in an Army unit make up the real heart of the organization and we see them as individuals and in groups. Finally we have the *technological* subsystem which is represented by equipment, material, SOPs, tactics, and operations of a unit.

Inherent in the systems view of organizational effectiveness is the realization that no subsystem or element, of the organization can change without simultaneously changing all of the other subsystems in sometimes unexpected and unpredictable ways. The successful practice of organizational effectiveness hinges on this basic understanding of organizations. Organizational effectiveness operations view every organization from the total systems approach, and are directed towards improving the entire organization, leading ultimately to more effective unit performance and greater combat readiness.
ATTENTION: OESO/OENCO'S

DO WE HAVE YOUR _ _ CORRECT ADDRESS? _ _

Based on the volume of "Return to Sender" mail received by OEC&S it is evident that our OE Network has some weak links.

Not only does an unknown or incorrect address affect delivery of the "OE Communiqué," but it also affects the delivery of the other publications that we are churning out for the benefit of the OESO/NCO in the field.

We are planning some major changes to the OE Communiqué in an effort to enhance its value to you. We are also contemplating a directory of names, addresses and phone numbers that will be aimed at strengthening our OE Network of practitioners. However, neither of these things will become practical or useful until we get on top of the mailing list.

If our publications are of value to you please take a few minutes to provide us with the information requested below:

NAME AND GRADE ____________________________________________

OFFICIAL MAILING ADDRESS ______________________________________

AUTOVON NO. # ______________________

GRADUATING CLASS ________________

CURRENTLY SERVING AS AN OESO/NCO - YES - NO

After completing the information just remove the page, fold it and drop it in the mail. It will be appreciated.

By the way, when you move, please think of us.
Submission date for articles for the next issue of the COMMUNIQUÉ is 15 September 1979. All articles submitted for publication in the COMMUNIQUÉ should be mailed to:

Commander
USAOEC&S
ATTN: Editor, OE COMMUNIQUÉ
Fort Ord, California 93941

NOTE: The OE Center has been renamed. All future correspondence should be addressed to: The United States Army Organizational Effectiveness Center and School (USAOEC&S).

Unless specifically stated, the opinions and conclusions herein are the view of the individual contributors, and do not necessarily reflect the view, opinion, or conclusion of the Commander, USAOEC&S. Reference to articles in this publication must include the above statement.

OE COMMUNIQUÉ June 1979
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Colonel William L. Golden, right, assumed command of the Organizational Effectiveness Center and School from Brigadier General Joseph C. Lutz, left, on 8 June 1979.

Colonel William L. Golden graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1957. He served an initial tour of duty of over five years with the 2d Airborne Battle Group, 503d Infantry at Fort Bragg, and on Okinawa in a number of positions to include command of two companies. Following attendance at the U.S. Marine Corps Advance Course, he served for 14 months as Senior Advisor to the Vietnamese 1st Parachute Infantry Battalion. He returned to the United States August 1965 to attend the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and then the University of Chicago where he earned his Masters degree in Sociology. From July 1967 to July 1970, he served as Assistant Professor and Chief of Behavioral Science Electives Branch, Office of Military Psychology and Leadership, U.S. Military Academy, West Point. He then returned to Vietnam to serve as Advisor to the G3, ARVN III Corps. A tour in the 3d Infantry Division, Germany was cut short when he was appointed, in May 1972, Army Aide to the President of the United States. During the following two years, he served as personal aide to the President and coordinator of the First Family and White House staff travel and support and traveled extensively for and with the President to both domestic and foreign activities. In August 1974, he assumed command of the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 509th Infantry Combat Team, Vicenza, Italy, the United States' element of the Supreme Allied Commander's multinational Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (Land). He then served as Executive Officer, Headquarters, Southern European Task Force before returning to the United States to attend the Army War College and to subsequently assume command of 2d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, Kentucky in July 1977. He relinquished command in December 1978 to attend Organizational Effectiveness Staff Officers' Course 1-79, graduating in April 1979. Colonel Golden is accompanied by his wife, the former Jill J. Johnson of Minneapolis, Minnesota and three sons, Bill Jr., 17; R. Scott, 16; and Jay, 11. Colonel Golden assumed command of OEC&S on 8 June 1979.
Commandant's Comments

I am very pleased to have become the Commandant, Organizational Effectiveness Center & School on 8 June and to follow in the footsteps of BG Joe Lutz whose tenure here was short but busy. The thanks of the OE Community go to General Lutz for his stewardship and to LTC Ancil Denzler who had shouldered the OEC&S Acting Commander load for over six months.

The most exciting aspect of my new position is that it provides me access to so many members of the Army who have the potential for making the Army better, in terms of combat readiness, organizational climate, professional satisfaction and myriad others. The "OE Community" is central to that membership and I look forward to becoming an active participant in the community's endeavors to provide OE assistance to commanders, leaders, directors and managers throughout the Army.

Much world-wide energy has gone into speculation about the fate of OE upon the change of the Army Chief of Staff. My informal info sources have helped to bolster my assessment that an OE endeavor which attacks the pain of the Army and results in increased readiness will continue to be viewed favorably. An endeavor which deals with peripheral issues and thereby misuses scarce resources is doomed. Thus, the fate of OE actually lies in the hands of the OESO whose energies must be devoted to enhancing readiness. Let us not be concerned about OE's fate, but concerned about whether OE is addressing the readiness issues and supporting directly the senior leader at each of the Army's posts, camps and stations around the world.

As a student in OESOC 1-79 I learned the tenet that to be most effective the OESO needs to work with and gain the confidence of the senior commander and other leadership members. I trust that all OESOs are striving to do just that, for if they are not, they are probably less effective than their potential.

Finally, I want to stress that all the OE expertise available at OEC&S, and through OEC&S contacts, is offered to the OESO who is in search of assistance to better do his job. Whether it be for the latest technique, resupply of materials or just friendly reassurance, the staff and faculty of OEC&S stands ready to help by phone or by mail.

WILLIAM L. GOLDEN
Colonel, Infantry
Commandant
OE
CENTER AND SCHOOL
UPDATE
A legal review of a USAOEC&S proposal to allow local reproduction of L&MDC by trainers in the field has recently been completed.

The Judge Advocate concluded in his opinion that "..." the copyright releases on file at the USAOEC&S for the copyright material in ST 26-150-6-1, Student Handbook, Leadership and Management Development Course, are sufficient to permit local reproduction of this text in the field.

There are, however, several important restrictions that must be adhered to regarding the reproduction of ST 26-150-6-1:

1. ST 26-150-6-1 may be reproduced in whole or in part only for use in official L&MDC educational/training activities.

2. Reproduction for sale or distribution for purposes other than official L&MDC training activities is not permitted without the express permission of the copyright owners.

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A copy of a new "Forward" and an "Acknowledgements" page permitting reproduction of ST 26-150-6-1 are inclosed. These must be exchanged for pages 1 & 2 included in previous editions of the text prior to submitting the text to the local AG for reproduction. (See pages 9 & 10.)

Reproduction of ST 26-150-6, Trainers Guide and Lesson Plans, and ST 26-150-6-2, Leadership and Management Development Trainer's Course Handbook, is not permitted. OEC&S will continue to supply these texts to certified L&MDC and L&MDTC trainers upon written request.

Inquiries concerning the reproduction of L&MDC material may be directed to:

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Fort Ord, CA 93941
AUTOVON 929-7058/7059
CORRESPONDENCE COURSES

Correspondence Course OE0003, Conducting Effective Meetings, is available from the Institute for Professional Development, Fort Eustis, Virginia. Students desiring enrollment are advised to see their local Education Services Officer for assistance in completing DA Form 145, Application for Enrollment.

EXPEDITING REQUESTS FOR PUBLICATIONS

The volume of requests for copies of the various publications produced by OEC&S is tremendous to say the least.

Your request for individual copies of OE publications can be processed much quicker if you include a self-addressed envelope or at least a gum-backed mailing label. If you are requesting several copies of a publication(s) you may wish to include more than one mailing label.

CONCEPTS DEVELOPMENTS

3-10 YEAR PLAN

CPT Tom Hawks presented the completed 3-10 year plan to a working conference of MACOM and DA representatives during 29-31 May. The purpose of the conference was to develop specific planning objectives and identifying the activities necessary to implement the plan.

The OE Division, Human Resources Development Directorate, DA, was given the task of staffing and implementing the plan. A brief description of the plan follows:

This Plan is designed to present a systematic method of increasing our OE capability to assist the Army in meeting its goals of force/unit readiness, strategic deployment, people, management, and modernization. It establishes the milestones, responsibilities, and management structure required to fully integrate the use of OE by the chain of command across all Army levels (battalion through DA).

Current OE field operations, for the most part, are focused at battalion level and below. Many OESOs do not have the prerequisite skills to work on the major issues at the command level to which they are assigned, i.e., division, installation, and MACOM headquarters. There have been some imaginative OE applications conducted at higher levels in the
Army that deal with major Army issues, e.g., the successes and failures of the volunteer force concept only serve to highlight the importance recruiting and retention are playing in today's Army. OE support at FORSCOM, HQ DA, and Recruiting Command have all been examining ways to improve recruiting.

Such future issues as greater demand for efficiency, more reliance on technology, and less resources will present the Army with challenges that emphasize the need to go beyond the current OE approach and begin to develop a program that has a systems perspective using complex OE methods.

In its present form OE has made a significant impact; however, future needs will demand far more from OE technologies. The focus of our consulting effort will gradually shift from the current state to an emphasis on core command/management issues, i.e.,

a. Clarifying organizational mission, strategy, objectives.

b. Mapping environmental pressures.

c. Improving planning processes.

d. Organizational design with changing tasks.

e. Managing conflict.

f. Managing organizational transitions and increasing readiness/productivity.

Certain OE knowledge and skills (assessment methods, goal setting, transition technique and time management) will be transferred to the Army at large to improve day-to-day operations. This will allow the OESO to spend more time consulting and less time training. In the near term, OESOs must continue to work within the chain of command and leadership style of the commander being supported in order to improve combat readiness.

KEY PLAN OBJECTIVES:

Critical tasks that must be accomplished to assure achievement of the 3-10 Year Plan are:

a. Develop OE skills necessary to assist commands in dealing with core command/management issues.
b. Educate the Army on these new technologies and provide them OE knowledge and skills to improve day-to-day objectives.

c. Establish a system to measure the progress and viability of the OE program.

d. Continue integrating OE methods into the TRADOC school system.

e. Establish a structure that will allow the program to make the transition from the present to the future.

PROCESS PERFORMANCE OF BATTLE STAFFS

Five battalions have participated as experimental groups in the CATTS since January. To date, the reaction of all participants has been very positive. As soon as the research data is compiled, it will be made available to the field.

The CAATS schedule for the next six months has been developed. OESOs from participating units will attend a workshop conducted by Dr. Olmstead at Fort Leavenworth during 12-13 July.

MAJ Dick White continues to monitor this program for OEC&S and solicits feedback from OESOs and Commanders who have been involved with process performance techniques. He can be reached at AV 929-7706/8.

JOB REDESIGN

A package on Job Redesign techniques is being prepared for distribution to the field. It will be available in the coming months. A Job Attitude Survey (JAS) is being adapted for Army use by SFC(P) Bartlett and Mr. Lloyd Nolan, OEC&S. If you have an interest in using job redesign strategies and the JAS instrument, contact SFC(P) Bartlett at AV 929-7886.

A PERSONNEL NOTE

MAJ(P) Tom Fahey has departed OEC&S to become the Adjutant of Letterman Army Medical Center. Tom had been with OEC&S since it's inception and has played a major role in the development of OE training. We all wish him the best of luck in his new assignment.
EVALUATION UPDATE

The primary project for the Evaluation Directorate during most of the summer and early fall will be external evaluation.

In the external evaluation effort, the major issues that must be addressed are: Was the student taught what he needed? Was he taught things he didn't need? The curriculum must always reflect the needs of the field and therefore information for the external evaluation effort must be collected from the field. The methodology to complete the external effort will consist of:

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All the information collected from the internal and external evaluation effort will be carefully reviewed and integrated with the 3-10 Year Plan to determine what changes, if any, are needed in the curriculum for 1980. Additionally, insights concerning doctrine and the management of the program Army-wide will also be available to DA and MACOM decision makers. The support of all field OESOs for this evaluation effort is critical to insure that substantive feedback on OE doctrine, curriculum and program management is provided to OECS, DA and the MACOMs.
FOREWORD

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The USAOECS wishes to express its sincere appreciation to the authors and copyright owners for their cooperation in granting permission for the use of their material. USAOECS acknowledges the contribution of the following authors and publishers.


2. Pages 27-28 Adapted from "Thinking and Feeling" by Anthony G. Banet Jr., 1973 Annual Handbook for Group Facilitators, John E. Jones and J. William Pfeiffer, editors.

3. Pages 29-30 "Congruent Sending: A Basic Communication Skill" by Paul Hansen. Published by Programs in Communication, Boulder, CO.


5. Pages 46-47 "Active Listening" by Gyla Smith, used with permission.


7. Pages 53-59 "Basic Skills for Creative Conflict Management" by Hugh Pates, PhD, used with permission.


9. Pages 75-84 "Managers Manage Motivation; They Don't Motivate" by Dr. Mark B. Silber, Defense Management Journal, VOL II, January 1975.
You might be one of the many people who wonder, "Would I make a good OE consultant?" Until now there was no definitive test to let one know how well he/she would fit into this exciting new career field. The following instrument will indicate your potential to be an OE *card carrying consultant. It has been extensively field tested for reliability, validity and validity.

Circle True or False

(Correct answers follow the test.)

**CIRCLE ONE**

T F 1. Esalen Institute is a high-powered Pentagon agency studying modern military tactics and named after WWI hero General George C. Esalen.

T F 2. I understand the definition of OE as presented in AR 600-76.

T F 3. I have read the definition of OE as presented in AR 600-76.

T F 4. I have never used an "I message" on my spouse ("significant other").

T F 5. I would take no offense at being called a "1-9" leader.

T F 6. I have never used the phrase "I'd like to give you some feedback" when I really meant "I'd like to tell you off but don't want you to get mad at me."

T F 7. I always neatly and evenly tear paper sheets off flip charts, and replace caps on Felt Tip markers.

T F 8. I have answered all 98 questions on the General Organizational Questionnaire.

T F 9. I have read all 98 questions on the General Organizational Questionnaire.

T F 10. When someone is saying something to me I never interrupt by saying, "What I hear you say is ...."

T F 11. "University Associates" refers to any small group of carefree college kids who often spend the daytime milling around "rapping" together and partying all nite long.
T F 12. The "Four step process" is California's version of the New York shuffle, a disco dance.

T F 13. While sitting knee to knee for two hours in a dead boring unstructured group a CCC frequently screams out loud.

ANSWERS - Give yourself two points if you answered properly.

(Proper Answer) Comment
1. False. It was WWII.
2. False. No one understands the definition of OE.
3. True. A CCC tries everything once, simply because like Everest it's there.
4. False. A CCC uses his/her hard-learned skills on whomever is available, sparing no one.
5. False. Never allow yourself to be called a "leader" - you're a "facilitator!"
6. False. The CCC can't afford to have people, especially clients, get mad at him.
7. False. Flip chart tearing to a CCC is like penmanship to a doctor - the act should be performed with a certain amount of professional disdain and carelessness for minor details.
8. True. See comment to #3 above.
9. False. There are only 97 questions on the GOQ. Got ya!
11. True. Have you never been to a U.A. workshop?
12. False. The New York shuffle is a term used for OD consulting in the Eastern U.S.
13. False. The CCC is trained to take cat naps during boring groups and screams only when taking surveys - like this one.

Add up your points (one for each proper answer).
Potential

Total 10-13 points = You could certainly be made OE consultant immediately.

5-10 points = You could teach OE.

0-5 points = You could direct the entire Army-wide OE program — in fact you probably are already.
THE OE FORUM
ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS AND ARMY GOALS

An address by LTG John R. McGiffert, Director of the Army Staff, to the members of the Capital Area Network for Organizational Effectiveness at Ft McNair on 19 December 1978.

Introduction

General Rogers had hoped to be here today to discuss this important and timely subject with you. He asked me to pass on his regrets and to pinch hit for him.

A few years ago, as some of you may know, I was one of your most zealous critics. That was before I had an opportunity to see the practical benefits of applying the methods of Organizational Effectiveness in addressing complex Army issues. The manner in which OE Staff Officers have performed their role, however, has convinced me of the merits and potential of OE.

Conferences such as this are very important for sharing ideas and experiences that each of you may have acquired in the field of OE -- a field relatively new to the Army. This type of forum enhances the reason we decided to institute OE in the Army in the first place -- to foster an increased awareness of management and leadership issues and our organizations, we hope to improve our ability to accomplish the Army's mission. That is why you are so important and why the job you are doing has a high priority.

This morning I want to discuss the role and relevance of OE, what it can do for the Army, our experience to date with OE, a few of the Army-wide challenges with which OE must grapple, and some of the major responsibilities I see for OE Staff Officers as we look ahead.

The Role and Relevance of OE

The role and relevance of OE to the Army is probably clear to you. However, it is important to begin with a brief review of this topic since it is not yet widely understood throughout the Army. Fundamentally, OE is a commander's program. The commander is responsible for its application and ultimate success. You, of course, are his primary staff assistants, armed with the expertise, time, and resources to do what independent assessments are necessary and assist in following up the commander's decisions. The thrust of OE is to support the chain of command and further mission accomplishment.

OE allows us to examine and improve our work habits in a very systematic way. It covers not only organizational arrangements but also the human relationships within the organization. OE also capitalizes on the results of previous studies of organizations, the experience and judgement inherent in the chain of command, and the perspectives of both the behavioral sciences and management. In essence, OE can assist how we do our daily business and address the major challenges that we face. This dual thrust is critical.
With OE, commanders are provided practical methods and consulting capability to address key organizational issues. And, because OE focuses on how units do business, it is important to understand the climate within which those units must function.

**What OE Can Do For the Army**

There are four factors which significantly influence the operating climate of the Army. These are rapid and accelerating change, increasing resource constraints, the nature of bureaucracy, and the personnel turbulence. An understanding of these factors leads to a better appreciation of what OE can do for the Army.

We are beset by rapid, and even accelerating change. As changes grow more complex; issues become more time sensitive; and our response to them must be equally prompt. Part of this phenomenon is due to the deadlines required in coordinating the efforts of a large organization, but many of our "crashes" with which you are so familiar are due to outside influences. The point is that feedback, both positive and negative, is needed quickly to ensure our programs keep headed in the right direction and are truly responsive to the need.

A prime example is the development of weapons or support systems with which a few of you are involved. A battlefield need is stated. A piece of equipment is designed to fill the need. It is ultimately approved, funded, built, tested and acquired. The process takes perhaps half a dozen years or more. By the time the equipment is fielded, is the original need still valid? Does the equipment fill the current need? Have training, doctrine, and logistic systems kept pace? Keeping our programs -- whether they are weapons design or recruiting or construction -- headed in the right direction is a major challenge in which OE can and must play a key role.

Another aspect of our operating environment is the continuing constraint on resources made available to us. Such constraints, as you can well appreciate, are liable to grow, not dwindle. It is a double squeeze -- our requirements grow more demanding, yet our restraints grow more severe. Nevertheless, our responsibilities for national security must be met. We must explore every opportunity to enhance our productivity, improve our management, and explore new ways to get something for nothing -- SOFONO, as the Sixth Army Commander has labeled one of his programs. To update an old slogan, we must get more deterrence for our dollar.

Perhaps the most pervasive aspect of our environment involves the organization itself. We are, for better or worse, a bureaucratic and hierarchical organization. Our output, deterrence through readiness, is difficult to measure. In the last analysis, its success is determined by events which do not take place rather than by those which do. Particularly in times of peace, our results tend to be measured in more quantifiable terms, such as the efficiency with which we use our resources, rather than the effectiveness of our military posture. While analytical tabulations of costs and efficiency are important -- and
bureaucracies excel at measuring them -- they cannot be allowed to push aside professional military judgment. Hard facts cannot be allowed to overrule valid soft ones without due cause. OE can help to temper our calculations, leaven our judgment, and keep the right goals before us.

Bureaucracies tend to be inflexible and to have a momentum of their own. Initiatives and fresh ideas that might bubble up from the lower layers, where people know the problems firsthand, tend to get trapped in the intermediate layers. These ideas seldom surface at the top layers, where they are needed most. Upward communication and feedback are needed if we are to respond to rapid change. OE helps to mobilize and tap talent at all levels and enhance the vertical flow of information.

Bureaucracies also demand specialization. The larger the staff, the greater the degree of specialization. This tends to foster tunnel vision, leading to provincialism and parochialism. OE helps cut across specialized capabilities in a staff and enhance the horizontal flow of information.

And finally, the turnover of key individuals in any organization -- a problem which is prevalent in the military -- compounds the difficulties of maintaining constructive continuity. OE can especially help in this area of leadership transition and sustaining unit improvements and performance.

These characteristics of the Army's operating climate are not foreign to you, yet they impact heavily on our ability to accomplish our mission. At this point let us reflect on the Army's experience thus far with OE.

The Army's Experience with OE

On balance, the Army's experience has been very positive. Our initial approach, which called for a gradual expansion of our awareness of OE and the use of this staff capability, has been validated. The key elements of that approach are familiar: (1) the program belongs to the commander; (2) OE methods are individually tailored to using units; (3) OE emphasizes the practical, and is not restricted to any single technique just because it might have worked well elsewhere; (4) training is required to provide OE staff officers with sufficient expertise to work at all levels, from DA and MACOM to installation and division; and, (5) the acceptance of OE is predicated on achieving practical results.

In spite of OE's growing acceptance in the Army, there are a few difficulties. First, OESO's are frequently used to focus on discrete problems that are a fraction of a unit's concern, such as AWOL's or motor pool maintenance. OESO's are not generally getting a broad enough perspective and becoming involved in the wider unit or organization issues. They have been focused on the smaller, more manageable issues rather than the larger, and perhaps less easily quantifiable issues that impact on the overall mission.

Second, emphasis has been more on management procedures than on management results. To repeat an old Army truth, keep the mission foremost.
Third, the emphasis on personal communication and the human dimension of feedback has led some to see OE as another "people" program. OE is far larger than that. We need to break out of the mold.

We have had very great success at using OE for major Headquarters, Department of the Army conferences during the past two years. Significant issues have been identified, and workable solutions have been or are being drawn up to tackle them head-on. That leads me to the next topic -- Army challenges -- the major issues that face the Army today and will face us in the next few years.

Army Challenges

The long term relevance of OE hinges on the extent to which you can be of real assistance to decision makers as they address our major challenges. We are pointed towards six goals in the Total Army: people, readiness, materiel, strategic deployment, future development and management.1 You should have copies of these goals in your offices and should be sufficiently familiar with them to understand how the missions, programs, and daily actions in your respective organizations contribute to accomplishing these goals. Collectively, these goals are aimed primarily toward NATO -- or greatest challenge. Yet, in addition to NATO, we must be prepared to meet other contingencies elsewhere which may occur on short notice. Our perspective is obviously global in nature.

Three broad thrusts guide our priorities for plans and programs which support these Total Army Goals. Our first thrust is near-term readiness which emphasizes the concept of force readiness and the M+30 package of forces which are needed for rapid deployment in the event of a major conflict. Our second thrust is mid-term modernization. The Army is now playing catch-up ball with the Soviets to meet the needs of the modern battlefield with new weapons systems. It is a massive undertaking, geared to capitalize on advanced technology. The command and management challenges to bring these efforts to fruition by the middle of the next decade will be extremely complex. Our third thrust is long-range sustainability. As you well know, we must be prepared to respond to any contingency on short notice, but this does not mean that

1The six Total Army Goals are defined as follows: Readiness -- Prepare the Total Army for rapid transition to combat, fully capable of performing its wartime mission; People -- Provide the Total Army with highly effective and morally responsible military and civilian personnel capable of performing reliably in war; provide quality of life support for our soldiers and their families and require from them reciprocal dedication to service; Materiel -- Develop, field and maintain a balanced warfighting and sustaining capability; Strategic Deployment -- Improve Army deployment capability to move forces as scheduled in order to increase early availability of combat power; Future Development -- Improve Army equipment and concepts to exploit new technology; Management -- Manage and utilize existing and programmed resources more effectively. Strengthen the Army's resource justification process.
any future war will necessarily be of short duration. The Army must be adequately prepared to rapidly and effectively reinforce and sustain its forces on the battlefield for as long as our national interests require.

The Army faces a number of specific challenges as we move toward these goals. It is important for you as OESO's to be aware of these so that your expertise can be used for maximum impact. In the people area, there is a continuing challenge to take what the nation provides us in the way of young men and women and effectively develop soldiers from civilians and make professionals from amateurs. Recruiting, retention, and initial entry training are particularly important. The changing composition of the enlisted force -- more are married and more are women -- poses special challenges. The quality of Army life, both on duty and in the community, is also of special interest. Army civilian personnel, who constitute a sizable portion of our forces, are just as important. Service Reform Act will require our best efforts to ensure our security and readiness are not degraded.

Force readiness, which encompasses unit and training readiness, also poses significant challenges for both the Active and Reserve forces. Annually, the Army participates in a variety of joint or combined exercises, such as REFORGER, in addition to unit training programs, but these affect only a small portion of the units that might need to mobilize in an emergency. Improvements in training readiness, such as the use of simulators and the Opposing Force Program, are vital. The Army is working hard to eliminate discrepancies and to increase our ability to participate in combined operations with emphasis on RSI -rationalization, standardization, and inter-operability -- and POMCUS. If you are not familiar with those concepts and initiatives, you should be. If you are not involved in some aspect of force readiness at your level, you should be.

In the area of management, we are extremely concerned about developing fresh ideas and improved methods for managing time, people, complex systems, forces, dollars and property. As I mentioned earlier, OE is designed to render unique and substantive contributions in this area.

These are a few of the major challenges. If OE is to have a dual thrust -- to improve how we do our business and to address the major challenges -- then it is incumbent on you to recognize that this latter thrust is where your efforts are needed the most.

2 REFORGER is the acronym for Return of Forces to Germany. The Opposing Force program permits commanders to maneuver against an opponent who uses the doctrine, tactics, weapons systems, and organization structure of the Warsaw Pact. RSI pertains to the interface of doctrine, weapons, equipment, and supplies as well as operational and administrative procedures with Allied forces primarily in NATO. POMCUS is the acronym for the Prepositioning of Materiel Configured to Unit Sets. POMCUS is designed to enhance the capability of CONUS units to move to Europe on short notice by prepositioning more equipment in Europe.
OESO Responsibilities

If we are to capitalize on the full potential of OE, then our first emphasis must be to broaden our vision and not get mired in micromanagement. This requires you to look across organizational compartments, horizontally rather than vertically, for the key issues affect more than one compartment. It simultaneously requires you to reach up to the commander's level for his perspective, for only then can you see the significant issues affecting the unit.

The second emphasis for our future efforts must be to increase senior officer understanding of OE and overcome the knowledge gap at the colonel level and higher. Training courses are underway to get the word out -- at the branch courses for company grade officers, at Leavenworth and the War College for field grade. OE is included in the Pre-Command Courses, the annual BG (Designee) course, and there is a special course for the key OE managers at senior levels in each organization. These help instill awareness, but you, too, have a responsibility. Document your efforts, for success is its best advertisement. It will help institutionalize our gains and keep our momentum moving forward.

Not all of the challenges I have mentioned -- and the Army faces many -- pertain directly to your situations, but I urge you to keep them in mind as you do your work. This will help us pull together. I appreciate the difficulties and pressures under which you work, but I have confidence in your abilities to help us address these challenges.
OBSERVATIONS ABOUT OD IN CIVILIAN INDUSTRY

LTC Don Van Eynde

I had the good fortune this past May to attend the OD Network Spring 79 Conference and to be one of the Army representatives at a presenta­tion on "OD in the Military."

Part of my agenda while attending this conference was to learn what I could about the status and trends in internal OD consulting in the civilian sector. I was particularly interested in determining the training background and consulting behaviors common to those internal consultants who appeared to be successful.

Although I did not have access to their bosses, I still managed to conclude that "successful" OD people are those who:

1. Are excited by their work.
2. Seem secure in their positions.
3. Were able to describe to me some significant ways in which they were helping to bring about meaningful organizational change.
4. Have access to the top team.
5. Seemed to have their "stuff" together both conceptually and personally.

The collection methods I used were observations and informal conversa­tions/interviews. These ranged in length from 10-minute conversations on coffee breaks in between seminars to 2-3 hour conversations over dinner or drink(s) in the bar.

The observations and/or conclusions I drew about the successful internal OD consultants operating in the civilian sector are that they:

1. Are personally "powerful" persons. In every case but one of approximately 15, they had an extensive background of personal growth training (similar to our individual week, L&MDC and unstructured group), as well as a substantial amount of theory/concept training.
2. Have access to and work frequently with the top team. They are involved in the planning phase of organization-wide actions.
3. Do mostly pure consulting and very little managerial training. A few use managerial feedback instruments such as LEAD SELF, SDI, etc. in their consulting role, but the majority do not.

4. Are giving increasing attention to evaluation, but only to the level of detail desired by their bosses. In about five of the cases, none were doing evaluations simply because they did not feel their boss required or wanted any. The other ten were evaluating the results of their work for various motivational reasons -- their bosses required it; they wanted to show their boss results even when he/she didn't ask for it; they wanted to insure they had results on hand in case the "axe men" (manpower survey teams) came around; or to better their own effectiveness.

5. Are very interested in societal trends in the work force of the 80s -- e.g., demands for increased leisure time, increased participation in decisions, issues related to increased numbers of women, single-parents and blacks in the work force, etc. -- and are actively searching for ways that management can address these trends.

6. Are making increased use of socio-tech type interventions.

7. Attend as many professional development events as their schedule permits.

8. Present a "straight" image to the managers with whom they work; e.g., have relatively conservative haircuts, wear dresses or 3-piece suits to work, and have purged their jargon of as many OD terms as possible when communicating with managers and workers.

9. Have a good "network" established with outside consultants and are quick to capitalize on those relationships when they have a consulting problem.

10. Have a deep personal conviction in the worth of their work.

11. Seem to be skilled in assessment techniques.

12. Prefer to help bosses reach their own decisions about actions needed, but readily provide solid suggestions/recommendations where the situation seems to warrant it.

I share these thoughts with you with the caveat that "all that's good for civilian industry may not necessarily be good for the military. I hope, however, that in hearing how others in this business achieve success may be of some use to you.
Along these same lines OEC&S is working with the Army Research Institute on an OESO job and task analysis; surveying the field; and making on-site visits. These efforts are directed toward keeping us on track and helping us to determine where we need to go in the future.

I urge those of you out there "where the action is" to share your thoughts with us on how to better prepare the OESO/NCO for success.
1. During August 1977, 22 of the world's leading practitioners in the field of large systems change met at a conference at MIT to discuss how to deal with the world's increasing turbulence and the resulting multiplying complexity of managing organizations.

2. Several of their findings are pertinent to the Army as a large, complex organization:

   a. The accelerating rate of change in our society has significantly increased the complexity of managing organizations.

   b. In the face of complex environmental and organizational pressures, those organizations that have not developed a coping mechanism may respond dysfunctionally:

      (1) Disagreement among people in different parts of the organization mounts, and as a consequence, decision making grinds to a halt; scapegoating becomes a substitute for action.

      (2) Solutions to specific and pressing problems are taken without regard to other organizational concerns, thereby exasperating rather than relieving organizational difficulties.

      (3) The complexity and uncertainty surrounding the problem results in a heightened emphasis on "legalism" -- rules, standard operating procedures, bureaucratic controls are developed and strictly enforced. Focus shifts to the controllable, e.g., expense accounts, leaves, attendance are scrutinized closely. Subunits of the organization focus on local goals and tend to become parochial in their methods of operations.

      (4) Organizational leaders feel constrained in both ends and means, and throughout the system understanding of accountability diminishes. Hopelessness, as well as helplessness feelings develop; passivity and compliance emerge as if they were the only options.

      (5) Complex problems are over simplified and as a result there is an increased tendency to fall back on old technologies and solutions to deal with novel situations.

   c. Those organizations that cope the best recognize and accept the inevitability of increased uncertainty of the future. They seek to
understand and adapt by assuming different frames of reference in relation to various organizational problems. With the goals of improving organizational outcomes, the strategy becomes that of involving an interactive diagnostic and action taking process based on tough personal choices about goals, constraints, and opportunities.

d. Choices do exist. Organizational success requires that change be managed based on two critical assumptions:

(1) Evolutionary trends may not be controllable, but their potentially adverse personal and organizational consequences can often be lessened by managing the change process.

(2) Where choice exists, an interactive approach is preferable to a reactive, passive, or even proactive one.

e. An interactive approach requires practitioners to abandon the myth of total rationality and control which, in the extreme, underlies the proactive stance. It also requires abandoning the cynical myth of no rationality and no control which underlies both the reactive and passive stances. A planful interactive approach makes allowances for powerful, perhaps irrational, evolutionary forces and for unpredictable and uncontrollable crisis by placing an emphasis on the need for continuous planning and replanning in the context of goals. It seeks to create simultaneously the stable thrust that is characteristic of a proactive posture and flexible core that is characteristic of a reactive one.

3. The Army counterpart to the practitioner described above is the OESO. He is trained to have the skills, tools, and systems view to assist commanders at all levels to cope with self-initiated or environmentally induced change. Few are presently working in this area because they have been focused on more pressing organizational problems -- albeit a bandaid solution, filling the void in human relations/human resources development/remedial leadership training. As the PMSO is trained to fill this void, the OESO can shift his focus to the "total system" and "change management." The OE 3-10 Year Plan is the DA management tool to accomplish this.
REFLECTIONS AFTER A YEAR

LTC John C. Lewis
Defense Language Institute

Not long ago I was interviewed by two researchers concerning my work and ideas about OE. When the interview was requested, I didn't think I would have much to offer, and was very pleasantly surprised to find I had developed a lot of ideas concerning the practice of OE. I would like to share these, for whatever they are worth. It is necessary, however, to put this in proper context as so much has happened in the 12 months since graduation from OETC last June. I have been immersed in a fair amount of intrapersonal work, and have completed all classwork for a Master of Science in Organization Development, with courses from Dick Beckhard, Warner Burke, Dick Fordyce, Stan Herman, and others. In between, believe it or not, I have been doing fairly regular OE work, mainly team building, transitions, problem-solving and planning. As a result of all this, it is hard to say any more which are my ideas, others' ideas, or ideas triggered by others. What is important is that they make sense to me and that I would like to share them ....

- Most organizations that ask for OE help are healthier than those that don't. However, after you have helped the healthier ones, the weaker ones feel even weaker (or more pain), and are then more apt to ask for help.

- Even weaker clients have to be more than 50% healthy or they wouldn't still be in command.

- So, they all have a lot of positive things going for them, and we need to build on those and point them out to our clients.

- We should reduce the use of the word "problem" in our OE vocabulary, and try to stay with such things as "change goals" and "areas for improvement." (Easier said than done!)

- Credibility is critical to the OESO. As we have all found out, it is essential to get those early successes.

- But, we need to move beyond the quick successes, fighting brush fires, etc. I believe that the true money for OE is in helping organizations toward long term improvement and in the transfer of OE skills and values to the unit.
We can't ignore the client's concern with the immediate problem (his brush fire), but we need to be able to move him into longer term actions with it.

There is a grave danger that if we get too tied up with being able to quantifiably justify OE that we will tend to do those operations that are more easily measurable in the short term, rather than those operations which can have a major long term impact but are very difficult to measure.

I find that I tend to be too casual in the contracting phase, much to my consternation later on.

We received a great "bag of tricks" from the OESO course, but we need to add a lot of conceptual ideas to them so that we tailor each of our operations and workshops.

The first several months on the job I really shied away from the "expert" mode of consulting. But then I woke up to the fact that we are experts, process experts and experts from our various past experiences. I have found that it is very appropriate at times to shift into the expert role. It has to be part of our flexibility.

We have to help our families keep up with change -- planned change. Any change, even for the better, is threatening. We need to apply some of our training and awareness to those closest to us.

Stan Herman's Authentic Management makes a lot of sense, with his G and 6 C's. I wish I used them more.

"Sheepdog" approach to OE. Helping the organization go and change where it was going anyway, but helping it do it better. Without OE it is a meandering change.

If you are doing too much work at facilitating (i.e., writing on butcher paper), you can't also know what is going on within the group.

When working with groups, there is always crap going on, or if there isn't, people will invent some.

As long as group issues stay at the abstract rather than the concrete, everyone can BS all day and feel real good about it, but they won't solve anything.
I've been a little bothered about interviewing lately. Are we telling the client how many gave a particular input? Only one? Client needs to have a feel for this.

Are we guilty of going after a particular problem by the way we ask questions, or follow-up on responses (i.e., jump on the negatives)? Are we forcing the results because of preconceived ideas? I'm trying to keep a close watch on this.

Most change problems take place at the interface of something, and we need to look at these more. Every subsystem has its own interfaces.

Where we are versus the ideal is crucial to find out -- we must know the gap. To find this out, we have to slow the world down.

A "change agent" is a facilitator of planned change.

Responsibility charting is an excellent method of conflict management. I don't know why it took me so long to use it.

Diagnosis should be a constant activity, throughout all phases of our operations.

Involvement leads to commitment. Ownership is critical at all phases, not just in planning.

We sometimes need to manage the "heat" of our feedback, to include the emotional impact of the way it is transmitted. We should not feedback data that is hotter than we think the client can handle, as that becomes counterproductive.

Probably my toughest learning has been how to cope with "marginality." It is tough to get used to being asked for your advice and help one week, then not the next on another matter when you know you have a lot to offer. Being half on the team and into content, and half outside watching the process. Knowing when to be in the client's world and when to retreat into our world. Being a little different than everyone else, and liking it!
Inordinate amounts of time can be spent by the Organizational Effectiveness Staff Officer (OSEO) in listening to clients express self-pity, self-righteousness, helplessness, and hostility. Displays of feelings ranging from elation to depression, anger to contentment are often aspects of an OE operation that can consume and frustrate the OSEO. These feelings may occur in any of the four phases of the OE Process: Assessment, Planning, Implementation, or Evaluation. The motive of the client for infusing the OE process with such tactics should, of course, never be presumed to be rooted in ill-intent or in self/other destruction. The reason for it is survival. The motive is a need for help. The result is usually transference of the problem to another person. The feeling of the other person is 'I've been had.'

The scenario might go as follows:

CLIENT: "I don't get cooperation from the other division chiefs. I need backing."

OSEO: "Tell me more about it."

CLIENT: "I just don't think other people are doing their jobs."

OSEO: "Please be specific."

CLIENT: "Well, there are a lot of little things that they don't do."

OSEO: "Some examples of what you mean?"

CLIENT: "Well for instance, .................."

Fifteen minutes later the OSEO has a much clearer understanding of what the client is referring to. The OSEO has done a superb job of 'active listening.' The client feels better than he has in weeks. But, the outcome of the interview has changed nothing. Hours or days later, the client sits in his office still feeling that he needs backing.

This paper was presented at the HSC OE Conference held 26-30 March 1979, San Antonio, Texas.
The scenario is recurrent and may often pervade the world of the OESO. Unconsciously, the client cleverly communicates hopelessness to the OESO. He is a victim of circumstances. "My staff is made up of fine people but they procrastinate," he comments. "They are good workers but they don't really care about what ultimately happens." Helplessly he adds, "What can I do to resolve this dilemma?"

OETC has a phrase to describe this process. It is 'owning the problem.' Whose problem is it anyway? Internalizing the conceptual message means that the OESO 'distances' himself from the victimized individual. Psychological distancing is the vehicle through which the OESO avoids getting 'trapped.' A sense of pride and accomplishment is achieved if the OESO can conclude the interview with the client owning the problem. Yet, what victory is there if the client remains submerged in self-recrimination, denial, transference, withdrawal, or displacement?

During a planning session with a client, I observed a note of absurdity in the entire process in which I was engaged. It was absured for me to be engaging this increasingly resistive, defensive individual in what was a futile conversation. Suddenly, I felt like my experience and education were getting me nowhere. The techniques that I learned and practiced at OETC were purely cosmetic. The drama of the interviews was emotionally-laden and sparked high levels of intensity. The techniques I employed were sound and the textbook models used would very likely have met with the approval of the writers who conceived them. But in the end it was all superficial. Movement or growth did not take place.

My own sense of the exchange was hopelessness, self-pity, self-recrimination. I was an emotional complement of my client. Suddenly, there were two of us. The client and me. And so I said: "You're right. Your staff is lazy just as you say. From what you've described, there is just nothing that you or anyone else can do about it. When you see them moving down the hall at a snail's pace that you spoke about, it's not natural. Its the way most people move. When they quit at the 1630 bell, it's normal. You're only one human being. The best thing for you to do is accept this situation and live with it."

Doing everything to keep my tongue from sticking in my cheek, I noticed my client almost come out of his chair. There was fire in his eyes. In an instant, his morbid depression was gone. He was incensed. He glared at me saying: "It's not normal; it's not natural." (Reader, five minutes earlier he said it was normal and natural.) "These people can work hard like all others."

"No!" I interrupted. "These people are different than others in this organization. It's like you said before: 'They are only blue collar workers.' It would not be fair for you to expect more from them. Just leave them alone and they'll do their work."

30
"Like hell I'll leave them alone." I noticed that my client actually cursed and for him, this was new behavior. "I'll see to it they start doing their jobs. Why, all I have to do is get out just a little more."

"Get out? How can you be expected to get out? Your paper work is already stacked up to where you can't get it out now. There's not time to get out!"

"Who says there's not time?" (Earlier, he said there was not time.) "I'll get my paper work done. I'll just do it a little more effectiently."

By this time I was actually enjoying myself and I said, "If there is any chance that you will have problems with your boss over not getting your paper work out, you shouldn't make any changes. Changes can really cause you problems." He corrected me, "Change is good for an organization." (This was a conservative talking).

I ended the interview and walked out with my head swimming. I could not believe that what had just occurred was real. It felt like a comedy routine -- but who was the straight man?

Ten minutes later, I was back in my office. I was approached by my graduate student who had been working part-time as an OE intern from a local University. Reflecting on the previous episode, I was not ready for her at that moment. She was telling me that she had once again failed in establishing a contact with her client. She had been attempting to get an entry interview for many weeks! We had explored the problem with great intensity. We probed external limitations, looked into internal resistance, even considered the possibility of supernatural forces that may have been sabotaging the intervention. When she repetitiously told me that the client simply could not be reached and would not return her phone calls, I was perplexed because I knew this client was interested in an OE operation. I assessed quickly. My student was unconsciously baiting me. She had me owning the problem. Why wasn't she taking action to resolve the problem herself? This seemed to be a situation calling for some OE absurdity:

STUDENT: "She just won't return my calls."

OESO: "I think perhaps its time to give up on her. Its a lost cause. I'm sure she doesn't want OE anyway."

STUDENT: "No. She does want some OE work done. Its not a lost cause."

OESO: "Oh, but it seems to be that way. I'll bet she recognizes you are only a student and just isn't interested."

STUDENT: "What do you mean by only a student?"
OESO: "Look, don't get excited. You've done everything in your power to get this thing going. You have sent messages, memos, made phone calls. There's simply nothing left to do. I know you're an A student. The rest of your work is outstanding. You're going to get your A even if you let this client slip through your fingers."

STUDENT: "Well, this client isn't slipping through my fingers."
(Student turns on her heels, walks out, and slams door)

Four Hours Later

OESO: "Where've you been today?"

STUDENT: "I just got back from ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . 's office."

OESO: "Who's that?"

STUDENT: "Don't be funny. I had a two-hour meeting and I was invited to her staff meeting. She wants all of her staff interviewed and is interested in knowing how her management styles are perceived."

Conceptual Framework:

Some have called it 'reverse psychology.' Others label it manipulation. The strategy from all appearances conveys an immoral, unethical approach aimed at duping a human being into believing something that isn't entirely true. Moreover, employing such an approach could be perceived as belittling and patronizing the individual. Such techniques may be viewed as transcending the boundaries of simple politeness not to mention the possible violation of human dignity. How then, can any moral/ethical professional who calls himself an OESO espouse, support or practice such tactics?

It needs to be maximally emphasized that the use of the technique is a "last resort" measure. It is exercised only after other rational and reasonable approaches have been taken. The OESO must make very conceivable attempt to work with the client using his own tested techniques such as active listening, reflective observation, direct confrontation, behavioral modification, etc. It is only when these methods are failing despite vigorous application, that the absurd approach is considered. If the client is at the level where he/she is dealing (or even trying to struggle) with the behavior or problem rationally, then absurdity should be avoided, lest it take on a manipulative and demeaning aura. However, in the face of a client displaying utterly absurd and futile behavior, a corresponding absurd response may often be the only thing to "shake the individual loose of his dysfunctional defense." Consider the example of the patient who is under-going analysis year after year at a cost of thousands of dollars, a common situation in the world of therapy and counseling. The therapist sits, listens, reflects, and asks how the
individual feels about various events or experiences. The patient responds, contemplates, and may even gain great insight; but change may not necessarily occur. Is it moral or ethical to perpetuate techniques that produce such marginal results?

In a sense, an 'absurd' response to absurd behavior is a symbolic and stinging slap in the face. It is designed to jolt the person. It is comparable to ice water being splashed in the face of an hysterical. It has a shock quality that very often awakens a person to the world of reality. Of most profound importance, it alerts the individual to his own capacity to take charge of himself; to exercise his own personal power in reconciling difficulties. The OESO becomes a mirror, reflecting back to the client his own absurd behavior. And when the client sees his image in the mirror, he is face to face with the stark choice of controlling his own fate or accepting fate as others deal it to him.

It is entirely possible and probable that the client, student, patient, whatever, will be angered and offended by the absurd retort. It is critical that if this occurs the OESO should not become defensive or abrasive. In fact, it is necessary for the OESO to recognize that if the client confronts him, this needs to be seen as a clue or indication that the person may be coming to grips with the issue. Should the client accuse the OESO of playing a game or being manipulative, there is probably little reason for any response at all. At this point, active listening or another traditional technique should be resumed as the critical response mode. If the client again slips into absurdity, the OESO does the same. As the client returns to rational confrontation, the OESO response flows accordingly.

The individual who has been the recipient of an 'absurd' confrontation by the OESO may not show any overt sign of resentment. Yet he may have strong inner feelings about what is taking place. Interestingly, even if the client doesn't verbalize his awareness that there is gamesmanship or manipulation taking place, (and even if he does express it) it simply does not matter. What matters is that the client is moved to action and behavior change. This is the guiding principle and indicator for the OESO to monitor. What is the individual doing about the dilemma; what is the person doing to resolve the problem? What the client thinks or says about the OESO's approach should have significantly lower priority than the action taken.

The credibility of the absurd intervention by the OESO is quite essential. The absurd response must have the balance of some element of plausible truth. This is what jolts the respondent. The overall thrust of the conversation or confrontation must come across as being credible. And yet, juxtaposing the notion of an absurd encounter that is simultaneously credible may appear as a diabolical absurdity in itself. But
interestingly, this perplexing process while radical, is at the same time dynamic. It creates a reasoning imbalance that locks the client in a problem solving activity which he otherwise resists. The key concept becomes 'accept the individual's resistance.' Accent the defenses. The individual has internal reasoning capabilities that intuitively drives him toward positive or constructive answers that he already holds within himself.

OE absurdity, to be effective, must be done with great care, calculation, and sensitivity. It may at first seem like a simple approach that anyone can readily accomplish. Not so. If done without skill, finesse and practice, it can not only make the practitioner appear abrasive and amateurish, it can also destroy the professional relationship. Like other OE techniques and skills, this approach if it is to be used, must be developed, practiced and refined. It must be used with the highest level of care, tact, and self awareness.

Readers interested in this approach may want to consult the following resources:


The writer thanks William Freeman, Practicing Consultant in Providence, Rhode Island, for his creative thoughts on this subject.
Once in a while we encounter a client who is able to speak from the lofty heights of an OE intervention in sufficiently earthy terms to bring us even closer to the grounded center we seem to perpetually seek. One such client, a Colonel, was experiencing the dual stressful events of giving up his command and retirement. We stopped as we were completing preparations for his Transition Workshop to process what had occurred. We asked if what we were doing was helpful and up to his expectations. His sad, sage answer came from 30 years experience and not just the preceding few days:

"Yes, what you're doing is very helpful. You know, giving up your organization to a fellow officer is like giving up your mistress to your brother. What you have had with your mistress is intensely personal and unique. Yet, you know that what they will have after you leave is going to be intensely personal and unique for them. And you love your brother so you want it to be as good for him as it was for you. So you'd like to tell him where she likes to be tickled and needs to be tickled, but if you do it could ruin it because he might not do things that were part of your relationship with her. You guys are like Masters and Johnson. When you come in as an outsider and tell him where she likes to be tickled and needs to be tickled, he might try it, and it will be that much better for them."
If you're actively involved in expanding your client system, or more specifically, if you'd like to establish a stronger foothold at the executive level, a recent accidental discovery of an unusual, but effective, method toward that objective may be of interest to you:

By way of background, the location of the OESOs in this large headquarters does not permit frequent incidental contact with staff directors and other influential potential clients. Although OESOs are recognizable to all of them and meet on rare occasions, establishing meaningful one-on-one contact requires a planned effort. The value of an opportunity to discreetly (or even not so discreetly) promote OE during elevator rides, cafeteria waiting lines, etc., when you have the chance to mingle with senior officers above your own staff level, is well documented and widely known. Furthermore, it is becoming increasingly apparent (as predicted) that merely "hanging out the shingle" and waiting for hordes of clients to break down the door seeking sagacious counsel doesn't happen in the real world, despite a record of success and an active informational campaign. Often needed is a "gentle reminder" of what OE has to offer in order to tip the scale in your favor, particularly among those interested-but-busy commanders and managers. It only takes one instance of "I've been meaning to call you about that" to validate the approach.

Without being too Freudian or attempting to plug body language experts, an excellent "mingling" opportunity may be found in a well-traveled restroom or more importantly, the "executive washroom." The specific learning experience in question occurred (thanks to a time call from nature) in the men's latrine frequented by the command group, special staff, and other high ranking staff officers (but not OESOs) and resulted in a contract for two highly visible interventions. Taking advantage of a moment of obvious openness and vulnerability, and appropriately phrased offer provoked unexpected results: "Yeah, I've been meaning to call you about that." Colonel [Client Number One] talks a lot about how positive it was for him when he arrived." From that point on, capitalizing on the situation is easy.

Another unexpected result and learning: As a contract was being closed while exiting from this newly found "business office," who should be entering but the "Big Boss" (Client Number One), on a brief but nevertheless required sojourn from the inner sanctum (off-limits to OESOs): "So you're becoming involved with OE?" This presented a unique opportunity for the new client to comment on his interest and involvement in this highly touted management resource (always a desirable situation): "Yes, sir. We're making arrangements for a transition meeting with the OESOs when I transfer." "Yeah," replied Big Boss, with a double-edged message: "Those guys can hold a meeting anywhere!"

Thanks, General, that made the day!
LTC Ramon A. (Tony) Nadal has been instrumental in improving the Army's use of applied behavioral science. He has taught leadership and psychology at the United States Military Academy, originated a series of studies called the CONSRC Leadership Board which revised leadership instruction in the U.S. Army, and in 1971 chaired a study for the Army Chief of Staff which led to the Army's involvement in OD, survey feedback, assessment centers and other behavioral science-based activities. More recently he was the Chief of the Human Resources Division in Forces Command, the Army's largest command. In this capacity he initiated an intensive OD effort throughout that command. His latest accomplishment was a study recently completed for the Army Chief of Staff on how to institutionalize OD within the U.S. Army.

Tony Nadal is an infantry officer with two combat tours in Vietnam. He has commanded infantry and Special Forces units in combat. His last command was an infantry battalion in Germany.

§ Meyer Cahn: Colonel, several years ago, the U.S. Army decided to make a rather sizeable investment in organization development (OD), calling it, as I understand, "Organization Effectiveness." I wonder if we might talk about some of the specifics of that decision and the development of that program. For instance, one of the first things I would want to know is the degree to which this is a voluntary program for your participants. Most of us think of the military as a place where soldiers are ordered to respond in particular ways. And OD is generally not associated with imposed programs.

LT. COL. NADAL: From the beginning, by design, we wanted this to be a voluntary program. All of us in the Army have experienced the many inspections and the guidance from above. We didn't want to create a system to give superiors one more club with which to beat their subordinates. We didn't want reams of data going up the chain of command that would enable the boss to come down and say, "Your morale factor is not as great as the morale in these other units." Our program is voluntary in the sense that no commander has to use the services of the Organization Effectiveness Staff Officer (OESO). The OESO functions as...
an internal consultant to the organization to which he is assigned (such as a division) and as an external consultant to that organization's subordinate units (such as battalions or brigades). It is mandatory that at certain levels Organization Effectiveness (OE) manpower spaces will be available. Incidentally, everywhere we have assigned trained OE officers, there have been plenty or requests for their assistance. If they were not being used, then we'd have a problem. A commander does not have to use the OESO himself, but that does not preclude his subordinates from using him.

Let me carry this voluntarism down to another level. I am speaking of the right of personnel in the Army to retain their own privacy in the event that OE training involved sensitivity components, for instance.

Army policy says that we will not be dealing with sensitivity training. Now there are some aspects of the OESO training which involve some personal growth development, but it is done at a relatively safe level. Out in the field, we are doing leadership or management development seminars which involve some feedback from the people.

About their personal styles?

Yes. But it is not at all intense. Not anywhere near as intense as the T group and it is done only in peer groups, not work groups.

Why isn't it? Isn't it tempting, occasionally, to set Army policy aside?

First of all, we know we would be on shaky ground to force someone to go to a T-group session. Secondly, because T groups are so atypical, so far from Army norms, the army is not ready for them. Thirdly, many of us who have had a hand in developing the system have read enough of the T-group literature to know that the T group has very mixed results. In my opinion, the effectiveness of the T group as a management training device is highly questionable.

One more point about voluntarism. If a commander were to request the services of an OESO, can he set aside the voluntarism for the captain or the lieutenant who serves under him?

That's a good question. Let me tell you the way it works. I'm the battalion commander. I call the OESO and say, "Will you come down and look at my unit?" Now, if I want to look at the whole battalion, he would do that. The OESO would generate data, and he would come back to me with undifferentiated battalion data. He would not bring me back data that says, "A" company looks like this, "B" company looks like this, and "C" company looks like this.

The entire battalion ...

Then he will say, "And I think you can do these things." He may say, "I think that team-building sessions for you and your subordinate commanders can really deal with some of the problems between you. They would be very useful." Now,
I can require my subordinates to attend the team-building sessions. I am not imposing anything upon them where they are going to have to produce any personal revelations. Also, what I cannot do is to cause them to do with their subordinates what I am doing with them. If I were a division commander, it would be within my purview to say, "I want all my officers to be present at this particular time, at this particular place, to do this particular thing, as a group." What I can't say is, "I want all the battalion commanders to go off for a week of T-group training," and I can't say, "I want all my battalions to have team-building sessions with their company commanders." Why? Because that may not fit the style of the battalion commander.

So there is recognition of that by the division commander.

To date we have had no problems with that. General officers have been very careful not to violate the voluntary or confidential aspects of OE. Not many of them have gotten personally involved, however. In many installations we have their subordinate officers (captains, majors, lieutenant-colonels and colonels) doing OE with the generals being very supportive. But they're not personally getting in the middle of the team-building sessions and receiving any feedback.

COMMITMENT TO OD

My next question might also be related to voluntarism. I understand that General Bernard Rogers, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, has said, "I'd rather have believers than participants." What did he have in mind there?

He uses that statement a lot. He is aware that the Army Chief of Staff is viewed as the godfather of OE, and that he has spoken out strongly in support of the OE program. This tends to generate an unstated demand on a lot of officers to get on this bandwagon. What he is saying is, "Look, if it doesn't fit your style, don't do OE just because you think it will make points with me." He says, "If you want to do it because you think it will be useful or helpful to your unit, do it; if you don't, don't do it." He wants people who believe in OE doing it, not people who are doing it just because they want strokes from the boss.

He understands the psychology of organizations, including the Army, I guess, where it is possible for organization members to initiate and undergo experiences that they are not really committed to.

Absolutely!

RESISTANCE TO THE OE PROGRAM

One of the things that most of us in OD are familiar with is a certain resistance to OD. Your concern for voluntarism is one manifestation of that. What is the nature of resistance to your program? And how are you dealing with it?
Yes, a lot of officers are threatened by it. They are threatened because of their mental model of how the Army runs - as a strictly authoritarian, hierarchical organization in which communication goes up and down one channel only, and where people do as the boss says. Of course, the Army, like any other large organization, has never functioned totally that way, but that is the ideal model that many commanders would like to see. And many of them think they can attain that, which is, in effect, not true.

§ You say the Army "hasn't functioned that way"; how does the Army really function?

The Army functions like any bureaucracy, with many informal nets of communication and many subpower structures. So, to the traditionalist, the creation of the OE consultant is a violation of that vertical hierarchy - as a guy who is outside the system, and with no responsibility for doing anything about the problems revealed in the data he gathers. The traditionalist views him as a threat to the integrity of the chain of command. They talk about "Rasputins," and "Commissars"; they use many other pejorative terms.

§ So this attack upon traditional expectations brings on one form of resistance.

Yes. The other basis of resistance is the fact that many commanders believe and say, "I don't need this OE because I've already done this. I am a good leader. Look, I've gotten to be a Colonel or a General and I am empathetic and warm and kind and courteous and reverent."

§ This is not unrelated to some of the responses that Chris Argyris gets to his Model II proposals.

Yes. They say, "I don't need these OE people to tell me what the troops are talking about. I don't need anyone to help me run my meetings. I know how to do all those things." A classic case is the commander who says, "Well, what is all this OD stuff?" I tell him, and then he says, "Ah! Gee, I'm glad you told me because, you know, I do all that." It happens over and over again.

§ So some commanders are well defended against OE?

Oh, absolutely.

§ In the composition of the Army, where does this resistance reside most? And where does it hurt the most?

It is mostly located at the Colonel, Brigadier General, and Major General level. It is funny, the Captains really like OE. When they participate in OD sessions, they are usually the guys who provide the information. They are the ones who have the grievances, who are finally getting a chance to discuss them openly with the battalion or brigade commander.
The Colonels sometimes are the most resistant for two reasons: (1) They oftentimes become the recipient of the negative feedback. Their illusions get shattered. (2) Some of them know that they are not going to be promoted again. But, as a rule, they are guaranteed 30 years service; so they are "tenured" full colonels. I think there is a significant portion of them who feel no inducement to change.

That is understandable. We certainly have that in academia.

They become the "brown shoes," as we call them. (Several years ago the Army changed from brown to black shoes). So they're back in the brown shoe era. They have become the traditional layer that says, "I didn't do it that way when I was a captain. Why are we doing this radical bull ... now?" There are, of course, many who are supportive.

THE OE CLIENTELE

When you reviewed the ranks, you didn't mention anything about enlisted men.

To date the focus of OE has been primarily within the officer ranks. The PFC and the NCO have been a source of data, basically around which the OE interventions are built. There have been some programs with platoon sergeants, platoon leaders and others at the company level. But 80% of the OE effort has been at the battalion command level and above.

So it focuses at the managerial or executive level.

The thought is that if we can get the top people to function together first, then we can start worrying about how to get the PFC to function more effectively. I see those as different problems.

Is it in the strategy to include enlisted men, or is that too ambitious?

To do interventions at the level of the PFC is, I think, pretty ambitious. I don't think we'll ever have enough people to do team building at the level of the rifle squad, for example. I see the bottom line being the company. We are developing other OD programs for such things as job enrichment and survey feedback, however, but they are not yet as well developed nor are they as individually oriented as the activities at higher levels.

OE ACCEPTANCE AND STRATEGIES

To return to resistance, what are you doing to minimize it?

The first strategy we thought about is the need to educate. We've got to remove all the myths from people's minds that this is just a humanistic program. Between you and me, it is a humanistic program, in a way, but we don't sell it on that basis. We are doing it to make the army better - ultimately, better at living on the battlefield, at fighting and, if necessary, killing. To get to the bottom line of OE, the Army is supposed to be better prepared to fight.
We have to educate people to the fact that the program's purpose is to enable us to develop better ways of interrelating in organizations, to cooperate more effectively, so we can do the job better. It has nothing to do with permissiveness; it has nothing to do with going soft; it has nothing to do with violating the chain of command.

One of the points I make very strongly at every seminar I give is that the commander who brings the OESO into his organization is the boss of the OE cycle at all stages. He can call it off. He can start it or stop it anywhere he wants; nothing happens without his approval.

He calls the OE Consultant (OESO) in initially and they discuss the area the commander wants him to work on. Then the OESO does his thing, bringing the data back to that commander. The commander can say, "I don't believe what your data says. Go away." Or he can say, "I believe your data looks good. Go away and I'll handle it myself." Or he can say, "I believe your data. Tell me what you think we can do about that." Once that is done, he will select what he wants to do. The commander is in charge at all times. We emphasize that. We've got to take the threat of losing his control away from him.

We try to teach about bureaucracies. I talk a lot about the inherent failures of bureaucracies, that anytime you put people into a triangular, hierarchical organization, human nature is such that you will get certain dysfunctions - certain things just won't go right. And, one approach at dealing with that is to realize what some of those failures are. We in OE are providing a way of ameliorating to some degree some of those bureaucratic failures.

Another strategy is to publicize our success. Army officers are a very competitive lot. Nobody wants to let some other commander get ahead of him by doing something that seems to be working. So we publicize OE successes. We try to use people the Army recognizes, particularly in the informal Army structure, the fellows with all the ribbons, the tough commanders and heroes. We try to get them "hooked" on OE, and then get them to be spokesmen for OE. They have credibility and can do more to sell the program than 14 PhDs. The army officer oftentimes will reject experienced people outside the Army because he says, "We're a unique institution. We have to do things this way because our mission is different and civilian experience doesn't apply."

In addition to this, we are now working on incorporating OE instruction in all service schools so that from the time an officer enters as a lieutenant until he goes to the Army War College he will have heard about OE repeatedly. So in 5 years every officer in the Army should have had some exposure to it. We want to make OE acceptable. We want to continue to pressure the system so that when the term OE comes up, the reaction will be, "Oh yes, I know all about that." It should be standard, accepted Army behavior.

Looking at Lewin's force field analysis, what we are trying to do here is to identify all the resisting forces and all the driving forces. We are trying to develop a strategy to remove some of the resistors. We have enough driving
forces right now. The U.S. Army Chief of Staff is a big one. We are working through education, through publicity, through word of mouth and through having role models to remove some of the threats. We are identifying the threats and are dealing with them.

As I listen to you, it seems that you not only have an awareness of the resistance, but a pretty solid program for it. And then I wonder are you attacking the resistance as though you were at war with it, and intend to win?

Oh, yes, by all means. You have given me a thought. We need to quantify the resistance more than we have done, because then we could better target our efforts against it. I may do some research on that, might try to come up with a quantified measure as to what it is, some survey that asks a man what fears he has about OE.

THE OE TRAINING PROGRAM

As I understand it, you have siphoned off a certain number of officers at the captain or major rank to be trained as OESOs. I understand that they are very able people, that you have managed to get, somehow or other, the very ablest and promising of young officers into your 16-week training program. Can we talk a little bit about that training?

It is basically a two-phase program. There are 11 weeks of both didactic and experiential training, and then 5 weeks of hands-on practicum under the supervision of a faculty member. The overall goal is to turn out a person who is qualified to do standard types of interventions. There is a review of the literature. There are discussions with many OD consultants. The school has systematically tried to identify the best interventions, and then teach people how to do them in an experiential fashion. The program also includes some self-assessment. We want OESOs to be able to interact effectively with other people. We teach some organization theory, primarily a systems view of organizations. Then the trainees participate in team-building workshops, in giving and explaining and analyzing survey-guided feedback data. They participate in problem-solving workshops, and the various bag of tricks, as they call it, that they are qualified to do.

What is their reaction to that training? Are they enthusiastic?

Fantastic! That school has the highest amount of enthusiasm from students that I have ever seen in the Army.

How would you account for it?

Two reasons: (1) For the first time these officers are in a place where they have to look into themselves, and the personal growth stuff that occurs at the start of the school really turns them on. (2) It is revelation to them that all this knowledge is available, knowledge which is pragmatic, very practical, very useful. In many cases it fits in with their prior experience. Now they are getting a chance to understand what has happened to them in their previous command experience. They get "psyched up."
So the curriculum makes sense to them.

Yes.

It makes sense to them personally, it makes sense in terms of their previous experience, and it seems that it will have some use in the future?

And additionally, they know that they are expected to go out of that school and perform that role. So a great deal of pressure is on them to learn everything they can before they get out there and are held accountable for their work.

It's not just an academic experience; it's for real.

Very much for real.

TEAM BUILDING

One of the things you mentioned earlier is team building. As I understand it, team building is very much an accepted part of what your OE program offers out in the field. Does this team building differ in any particular way from what we might find in other kinds of organizations, such as large corporations or public agencies?

No. I wouldn't think so, except in the prohibition on sensitivity-type activities. It has to be task-centered team building. Now, in some cases it gets very intense.

A nice story has been written by a battalion commander who did some team building. It is very emotional. Recently published in Army Magazine, it told of his experiences with team members and how they all ended up in tears and hugging each other. That is very atypical of an Army organization. Most team-building sessions don't get that intense. Most of them are structured around the issue of: What are we doing now? What are our missions? How can we do them better? That session, however, apparently significantly improved the unit's performance thereafter.

What would be the composition of that team?

Well, it depends. The largest group we've had has included a three-star corps commander, two division commanders, I forget how many brigade commanders, and a scattering of the battalion commanders, the corps staff, full colonels and some sergeant majors. About 50 people.

Over how many days?

That one was 2 days. The 82nd Airborne Division has done team building three times now. They've taken all the chain of command from the commanding general down to the battalion command. Four days, off-site.
Would you say that team building represents one of the particular areas of your program that has had good acceptance?

Yes. I don't know of any team-building session that has not ended with a favorable outcome. People come to them skeptical and sometimes actively hostile about being there. ("I've got too many goddamned things to do to waste my time for 3 days sitting out here.") But when they leave, they have had a chance, in many cases for the first time, to get a lot of things off their chest. And the anonymity of the process, the chance to speak openly ...

Why do you say "anonymity?" They're right there.

Anonymity, because in the big team-building sessions we break them up into peer groups. All the battalion commanders get together and they make a battalion commander report, a compendium of the data. It is presented by one person chosen at random, so they have a chance to speak pretty candidly.

That may tie in to the next question I want to ask. Commanders have brought their staffs together ever since Julius Caesar, or earlier, I suppose. What is the element that is different now, about team building, as against the more traditional way of a commander's meeting with this staff?

First, it is a prescribed exercise at a different location from their normal meeting place. They go there knowing that their goals are going to include honest, open communications, and some problem resolution. The commander goes there with a mental set that the objective of this exercise is not for him to tell the staff what to do, but for them to develop a better team relationship. Second, present in the room is a facilitator whose function is to structure the meeting, to manage it - as against the boss' function. Third, we try to isolate the participants from their outside interests. We try to get them off-site, away from the telephone, and their command. We try to get them to forget the problems "back home" for those 2 or 3 days. You go there with the mental set that what we are going to do for 48 hours is to focus on learning how to operate together more effectively.

ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS STAFF OFFICER ASSIGNMENTS

As I understand it, when an OE officer graduates from the 16-week program and moves out into the field, he is going to remain there only a few years. Then he is going back into the line again, or, as Brig. General John H. Johns said at the APA, he is going to be "recycled."

Yes, that's right. There are good and bad sides to that. The good side is that we are seeding the Army with officers who have had this OE experience. Because we have taken very good people, the probability is they will survive the Army system, and eventually - 20 years from now, if we can hold on that long - we're going to have general officers of the Army who have had OE training. That day will be an important one for the U.S. Army.

The bad side of it is that we are not building in-depth experience in the OE program itself.
OESO RESULTS

5 What kind of results have your people achieved?

That is a key question and one that I don't feel as good about as I should, or as I would like to. We don't have much reliable data. We have a lot of anecdotal data. We have tapes of battalion commanders saying that equipment maintenance became significantly better. (Sometimes they don't associate it with OE.) We have cases of people saying that training became significantly improved. (It may be the function of the OESO to help develop a training program.)

Results are quantifiable. We have one case of a battalion commander who said that his success rate in his personal reporting system went from 77% to 92% after an OE intervention. Team building, as I am sure you know, is hard to quantify. It is easier, of course, to quantify the results of the task-centered efforts rather than the process-centered ones.

We have one little study of improving the repair rate in a signal battalion and another on improving the relationship between the maintenance unit and the infantry units in Europe. As I say, the process stuff is different. When you teach someone active listening in the chain of command, you are assuming that some problems won't happen as a result of that. But it is hard to quantify, for example, whether fewer folks will go AWOL. In the long run, I think we will be able to quantify some of that, like organizational climate, for instance. The Army has just launched, through the Army Research Institute, a major multiyear research effort to quantify results of OD as well as to develop a taxonomy of interventions that can be used to deal with particular problems.

CRITERIA

5 What are the hard kind of criteria that would impress your toughest opponents of OD as well as the "producers" in the Army? AWOL rates?

Yes, that would be one of them. But that is not the ultimate criterion. It is difficult to measure the Army's output in peacetime. Our function in peacetime is to train and to be "combat ready." But combat ready is an amorphous, undefined status. We're trying to increase the availability of our equipment rates. Yes, one good criterion measure is the availability of equipment. (For instance, is the equipment being maintained better?) In a tank unit, tank gunnery would be one. If the outfit ends up shooting at a yearly tank gunnery exercise more effectively, that is measurable. Yes, that would be a significant criterion measure. Another is re-enlistment and retention of people in the unit. That is significant because it is tough to get people for the Army. It is important to keep those we've got. Another measure is the success in our various inspections.
Many little measures are significant to the normal Army structure, things like soldiers getting in trouble, problems with civilians, fights in barracks, and, of course, inspections. The Inspector General annually inspects every unit, and again, the equipment availability at a particular time. Many units will have a surprise fall out, where everyone has to go out and get all the equipment and run it, and make sure it runs. Those are the sort of things which will impress commanders.

EVALUATION OF OE

§ What is your private opinion about the current capability of OE as measured against those criteria?

I think that we're going to have to be careful not to oversell OE. We have had too many interventions designed to do one thing, and then we try and measure some independent variable which is 40 miles away. If you do a communications workshop, don't try to then measure equipment maintenance effectiveness as a result of it.

It is going to be tough to develop OD programs which are related to specific measures unless you start out with that being the purpose of the intervention. If you say at the start, okay, we're going to do OD in this unit so we will do well in tank gunnery, then you can work specifically on that. You can do some sensing of the troops. You can determine the status of tank gunnery skills in the battalion. How do your PFCs feel about your capability to do well? (They are the ones who are ultimately going to go down range in those tanks.) You could use OD to measure attitudes of training. How effective is it? Okay, we have been working now for 3 months, or for 3 weeks, to get ready for this tank gunnery exercise. How effective is that training? How can we make it better? I can see some vertical and horizontal slices in the organization coming together to help design a more effective training program. Then, I would be willing to say that OE would work well in helping that battalion do better at tank gunnery. But don't try to measure tank gunnery on the basis of a team-building session with battalion staff.

THE OESO JOB

§ Your OESO graduate goes out to the field, is assigned to a division with about 16,000 troops. There are two OE officers in a division. You might say that they are rather outnumbered. They only have each other. Has that become a problem?

Yes, I believe it will become less of a problem in the future as OE gains more acceptance. But right now, it tends to be a pretty lonely job. However, I will say that in most divisions in the States the division commanders have opted on their own to have not two but four OE staff officers. We told them they had to have two, and many came back and said they wanted four. That, in itself, is an indication that OE is gaining acceptance. But currently it is a pretty lonely job. We have to develop a support structure for them. I tried to do that in Forces Command by creating, within my office, a backup consulting group with the ability to send personnel out to visit, to assist, to collaborate with them.
Another thing we did for support was to bring all the OESOs back into the Forces Command headquarters to give them a chance to talk to each other, to rub elbows, to hear the General of the Forces Command talk to them, and to get strokes. It was at that session that it became obvious that some OESOs didn't like the boss getting the OE Forum,¹ because they were getting pressure from the boss. The boss would open it up and say, "Hey, Joe, come up here and see me and tell me why the hell I'm not in this book. What have you been doing, Joe?"

Now, the current Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, General Bernard Rogers, has been 100% supportive of your OD concept and program. It is a dream of many an OD consultant to have a chief executive officer who is 100% behind his effort. The fact that you have him behind you is, I guess, something that you can tactically and strategically use now, but you can't count on it later. Do you have a strategy based upon this temporal condition?

Implementing that portion of the strategy is probably the most difficult challenge. We have to create an organization which will exist and which will survive General Roger's departure as Chief of Staff. So I tell people we have to make hay while the sun shines. Well, the hay we have to make is the creation of an infrastructure which will enable us to operate without his pressure and his prestige.

Walton (1975) has done a study of major corporations that have engaged in significant changes which were eventually not sustained. Also Shel Davis and I had a discussion about this very subject of Change and Change Diffusion in this very journal (1976). I suppose the recycling of your OE people into line positions is perhaps one of the most significant strategies for this.

Yes, that will certainly be a factor, if we can hold on that long. We've got to select among the officers in the Army those people who are highly competent, who would, regardless of whether they are doing OE or not, survive, succeed and move up. There are certain slots in the Army which are key for the OE program, maybe a dozen of them. OE believers have got to be assigned to these slots. We need to develop a chain, a network of people who will keep nurturing each other. I have a mental image right now of a bunch of guys on top of a mountain fighting off the hordes. We've got to keep fighting off the hordes long enough for a bunch of little babies around it to grow up. The babies are the OESOs being cranked out of that school, being diffused throughout the system, some of them rising to different command levels, and so forth. But in the meantime, the infrastructure has got to hold off the alligators.

¹A 50 to 60-page journal circulated to OESOs and their commanders in the Forces Command.
REFERENCES


"Make it pragmatic. It must contain information--workshops--ideas--articles that OESO's can use to make OE work in the Army. That's the mission of the COMMUNIQUE."

These were the directions given to the editor of the first issue of the COMMUNIQUE by the Commander, OETC. And to this end, countless people have worked long hours.

However, to meet the needs of OESO's, we must know what you want--what you need--what would be most helpful--what you have learned. So, we have included OESO tear out sheets. There are three tear out sheets, each addressing a different topic.

The first tear out sheet addresses a simple but critical topic. What can we at OETC do to support your OE efforts? What kind of help do you want from us? How can we assist you? The second tear out sheet is one which provides an opportunity for you to discuss your OE efforts with other OESO's. It provides an opportunity for you to share innovative ideas--new workshops--new study projects--programs, whatever is working (when working) for you. The third tear out sheet is to talk about "lessons learned." A great body of knowledge about different types of interventions resides with OESO's. OESO's can profit from the lessons learned from those interventions as the information is presented to them through the COMMUNIQUE.

Why not spend some time right now and provide us with some much needed information which will be edited and included in the next issue of the COMMUNIQUE.
SUBJECT: OETC OESO Assistance

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SUBJECT: OE/OESO Efforts Updated

Editor
OE Communique
USAOETC
Fort Ord, CA 93941

Tear out #2
SUBJECT: OE Lessons Learned

Editor
OE Communiqué
USAOETC
Fort Ord, CA 93941

Tear out #3
THEORY AND PRACTICE
"BATTLE STAFF OE"

CPT Rick Joslyn
Ft. Hood, TX

As a recent graduate of OEC&S (5-78), I was "chomping at the bit" to utilize the techniques of "OE in Combat" which class 5-78 received at OEC&S. When III Corps and subordinate units began to gear up for a major training exercise, BRAVE SHIELD-19 (BS-19), my expectations were met.

The preparations for this exercise by my unit provided an excellent opportunity for the use of "OE in Combat" techniques to aid commanders and their staff in a field environment. The preparations for BS-19 included a brigade CPEX and a 5-day FTX. During the CPEX, the unit utilized the four-day operation where I observed the process of the unit TOC (tactical operations center) and LOC (logistical operations center) while the unit supported elements of a division undergoing their ARTEPs.

PEGASUS was operated from a central player board where unit operations centers fought the battle against a threat force by executing and maneuvering according to the original OPORD and the FRAG orders issued by the commander.

My "OE in Combat" began with an initial request from the unit commander. He had used OE previously in a change-of-command transition, and was highly receptive of the process. Additionally, the previous OESO had mentioned that recent OEC&S graduates were receiving "Battle Staff" assessment skills. My experience in Europe with the 8th Infantry Division as a battalion S-3 while MAJ Ripley conducted an OE operation during CARDINAL POINT II was an excellent background vehicle. I coupled that experience with the OEC&S techniques and initiated the assessment. MAJ Ripley's article, "Bottom Line OE" from the January 1979 COMMUNIQUE was an excellent source document. Other background materials that I utilized were: the unit's TAC SOP, MTO & ARTEP results, OPORDs, case studies (from OEC&S), and the commander's notes from his change-of-command transition.

During the initial meeting with the commander, I explained the process I would use and how I would gather the data. Basically this process consisted of the seven processes used by MAJ Ripley and a few particular to my unit. The commander's objective was to determine the effectiveness of his current tactical operations center, and if time allowed, the logistical operations center. His staff had never operated as a team in a tactical operation. This fact added a unique dimension to the assessment. As a result, the commander's concept of how his operations center operated was based on his own experience and the unit's TAC SOP.

The actual process observation I utilized was a systems combination of the K&R model and O-M-R. I substituted the "key considerations" for each job area (S-1, S-2, S-3, S-4, FSO) as MAJ Ripley did in the K&R model. Within each job area I utilized O-M-R for each process employed by that staff officer to gather and disseminate information to subordinate and higher units.
Utilizing this combination "Battle Staff System," I observed the staff during the CPEX. Previous to the CPEX, I had interviewed each staff member on his concept of the operation and his job during the battle. I plugged these responses into the "battle staff system" and then observed their actual process during the CPEX. I traced the information transmitted from the brigade to the executing unit, and then re-traced the after-action information. This process revealed a communications blockage, and a conflict in interpretation of how the battle was going. I then briefed the executive officer on my observations. (The commander was required to depart on TDY so my client had changed. This change was an actual advantage as the executive officer would direct the unit during the FTX, and was also coordinating his staff's efforts.)

I held my observations of the staff during the CPEX for the actual FTX to utilize them in an evaluation/follow-up role, and to check/verify possible problem areas. Fortunately the FTX took place two-days after the CPEX so I did not lose the timeliness of the observations.

The FTX, itself, was a phased process observation. I separated the actual preparation and the execution into phases based on what the unit was executing at the moment. (i.e. quartering party, convoy, TOC/LOC, offense/defense etc.) After each phase, I briefed my observations to the client. As a result, he initiated several techniques which alleviated some of the problem areas. I facilitated the sessions, and in some cases, assisted in a one-on-one role clarification. All of these sessions took place at night or during "dead time."

The four-step process--assess-briefback-implement-evaluate--continued for each phase. Some additional techniques utilized were: team building, communications workshop, and a short leadership style inventory.

As a result of some observations, the unit effected some on-the-spot changes such as the physical arrangement of the TOC, and although a relatively new staff, they began working more in a "team sense" when the exercise terminated. This same teamwork has flowed into garrison operations and initiated more follow-up projects in a continuous program.

Some cautions to be aware of during the "battle staff system" are:
--Insure the client makes his staff, to include the "PFC manning the radio" aware of what the OESO's role is. Failure to define his role can lead to the OESO viewed as an "evaluator" and causes an increase in activity whenever he is visible. This activity tends to color the data and observations.

--The OESO must prepare himself for the unit. He must understand the tactical doctrine; be able to visualize the concept of the battle from the OPORD, and relate that to what actually happens on the ground. Once he does this, and it is evident to the assessed unit that he is a "professional" the inclusion issue is greatly decreased and his data becomes "real."
-- Do not overload the client with OE terminology. In fact, throw it out of your vocabulary. Not only does the utilization of "OE language" cause a definition time lag, it also increases the communications conflict during data brief back.

By utilizing all of the OE skills, past experience, and "real" assessments with clients, the OESO can greatly aid the commander in increasing the effectiveness of his combat readiness--and that is what it is all about. As long as the OESO "paints it green", the use of OE as a vehicle to aid the commander in a "battlefield" environment has no boundaries. The OESO is limited only by his own imagination and his ability/confidence in his "OE" skills. As MAJ Ripley so aptly put it: "We must use our skills to produce results that equal improved mission accomplishment."

(NOTE: MAJ Ripley's article was a excellent vehicle to initiate my operation and I express my appreciation for the access to it.)
ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS: A PARTICIPANTS VIEW

1 LT. DAN WARE
FT. HUACHUCA, AZ

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

I was assigned to the organization in March of this year as the S-1 Officer with responsibility for the battalion's administrative functions. As one of my first duties I was responsible for the distribution, administration, and collection of the battalion questionnaires. This served as my initial contact with the OE program.

The program had begun on 17 November with a letter from the Battalion Commander to the Post OE Office. This letter requested assistance in evaluating organizational structure; division of responsibilities between commanders and staff elements; and internal relationships.

CONTRACTING PHASE

The 17 November letter actually started the contracting stage, i.e. the request for help. The contract process continued through 1 December when the Organizational Effectiveness Staff Officer (OESO) received an organizational briefing from the Battalion Commander. It was also at this 1 December meeting that the discussion of the possible uses of the OESO and the application of the army four step method of OE really began to pull the contracting effort together. These steps will be discussed at length later. It was not until 16 January that the Commanding Officer started to voice specific problem areas; there were approximately 20 items he wished to treat as problems within the organization (Battalion). It was agreed at that time that a survey was needed and it was to have as its basis those problem areas identified by the CO. On 24 January they discussed approaches to data collection or assessment and clarified (or defined) their respective responsibilities. At this meeting they were able to:

1. Define the problems of the organization as perceived by the CO.
2. Clarify the roles of both the commander and the OESO.
3. Gain mutual trust and respect.
4. Gain an understanding of what a successful OE effort would mean.

This concluded the contracting phase.

ON TO ASSESSMENT

25 January, together the CO and the OESO worked on formulating the questionnaire around the CO's concerns. Every question keyed in on a specific weakness or strength which represented problems and possible problems the battalion had. Most questions were worded positively and answered on a scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree.
25 January thru 6 February were spent on refining the questionnaire and developing a cover letter to be signed by the CO explaining the purpose. The cover letter also served as a letter of introduction for the OESO. Explaining what he would be doing within the organization and requesting full and honest cooperation from members of the organization. From 6 thru 27 February, arrangements were made to get the questionnaires, including the letters printed. Also at this time the Battalion executive officer was brought into the OE picture and updated on all that had happened to date. The XO then began to set up interviews between the OESO and organization members. The OESO developed an interview guide to assist him in getting information directly from the people involved on specific questions and concerns of the CO. Additionally, the OESO made preparations for a computer program and coordinated computer usage. For the month of March the OESO conducted interviews, both one to one and with groups, such as Senior NCOs, Junior NCOs (male and female) and project managers (civilians). He also met with members of the top team which consisted of the Executive Officer Battalion Command Sergeant Major, the Plans and Operations Chief, Quality Control Chief, Chief Project Officer and Company Commanders.

Each time the OESO met with a group, the CO or XO introduced him and explained his purpose. I, as the S-1, was responsible for the administration of the questionnaire to all the troops in the garrison (not on temporary duty status) and the mailing of the questionnaires to all TDY sites. This was all accomplished during March and early April.

In addition to the scaled multiple choice answers, there were three spaces allotted to bring items of interest to the attention of the CO. Also there was a space on the questionnaire for general comments about the subject of the individual's choice. These narratives were grouped and categorized into strengths and issues of the battalion, and written up as such on "butcher pads."

To complete the assessment phase, the following criteria were satisfied:

1. The mode of assessment was identified.
2. The mode of assessment was produced.
3. The mode of assessment was distributed.
4. The actual data collection took place.
5. The actual data was categorized and summarized.
6. The feedback was presented to the CO.

FEEDBACK / PLANNING

On 2 May, the OESO and the CO met for approximately four hours to discuss the data collected. It was at this time that the CO decided to move away from the original three areas in which he had requested assistance. In light of the feedback he had received, the CO decided it would be better to concentrate the OE effort in such a way that would benefit the incoming Battalion Commander.
Therefore, efforts were now switched to prepare a presentation of reccommended action at the next Change of Command Meeting.

The CO was of the opinion that it takes up to six months for a new battalion commander to learn all the problems of the organization and begin to formulate workable solutions. So, from 2-18 May, the CO, the incoming commander, and the OESO reviewed the feedback and prepared a transition model. This transition model was to be the top team's guide for the change of command meeting. However, before the top team could meet any expectations made of it, members had to be briefed at length on the issues facing them.

That decision was made at the 18 May meeting. Also at that meeting, plans were made for feedback to the troops. Additionally, a tape on time management was reviewed and approved for viewing at the change of command meeting. The CO felt that the film would emphasize the importance of time management as a tool for his top team to become more effective managers.

At this point, in light of the 22 May change of command, the CO retired from the scene. After the OESO and the XO agreed on a transition model and plans which would lead to the change of command meeting, they collectively briefed the new commander and got his approval. On 24 May the OESO and XO met with the top team in accordance with the plan. The top team reached a consensus on some strengths and issues of the battalion, and gave them priority according to the frequency with which each had appeared in the feedback. In this meeting it was discovered that the difference in areas of interest between command and staff dictated that separate meetings should be held. In these separate meetings both the command and staff elements were to decide which issues could best be handled by which element, doing so with as little collaboration as possible.

Additionally, once the division of issues was agreed upon, solutions were to be sought. Amazingly enough, there was very little conflict in regards to areas of responsibility. Those issues that were gray areas were decided by the XO. These meetings took place from 25 May to 8 June without the aid of the OESO, as was contracted between the top team and the OESO.

At these meetings, in addition to dividing areas of responsibility, solutions were brainstormed using the pool of knowledge, expertise and skill which existed in each group. These solutions were to be presented at the change of command meetings as suggested courses of action for the new CO to use as MBO's to higher headquarters.

On 8 June the two groups met together with the OESO serving as the meeting facilitator. At this time, the two groups exchanged information. The OESO provided some process observations and meeting management input which made the meeting move smoothly and with greater productivity. The two groups agreed to meet two more times without the aid of the OESO, but later found the need for a third meeting. All three meetings were final coordination efforts to enable the group to present a completely unified plan of action to the CO.
The top team stressed the need for such unification, stating it could not be over-emphasized. The group selected the XO as overall spokesman. The 27 June meeting which was the final coordination effort on the group's part ended the planning phase. Criteria satisfied in the planning phase are as follows:

1. Top team identified issues and strengths from feedback.
2. Top team developed solutions to the issues.
3. Top team evaluated planned courses of action and ensure unified position.
4. Top team selected the solution with the least amount of risk.

**IMPLEMENTATION PHASE**

On 28 June the change of command meeting was conducted. Each member of the top team was allowed to present his particular area of concern, pointing out the issues and suggested solutions. Collectively, these solutions provided the commander his overall MBO themes to be presented to higher headquarters.

**EVALUATION PHASE**

At this point the OESO gave his closing remarks, reviewing steps taken and evaluating the team effort. This is the point at which his involvement ended.

**CONCLUSION**

I perceive a difference between a transition model and the normal four-step process. That difference is in the implementation phase. In the transition model the implementation phase is the presentation of planning. Ordinarily, implementation would mean putting those plans into action which in turn changes evaluation of plans into evaluation of action and its results.

OE's action research process, i.e. the four-step method modified to accommodate the transition model brought about the following improvements within the battalion:

1. Enable the CO to honestly and realistically enter the MBO system.
2. Taught the Command and staff elements a more effective way to conduct meetings.
3. Enabled the CO to learn about his top team and vice versa.
4. Problems were uncovered and solutions offered.
5. The level of trust and respect was raised and a sense of teamwork developed.
The OESO in this case was such a motivating force that it appeared success was imminent from the start. It is hard to believe that in the eight month span of involvement he could have had time for any organization but mine. In fact, he did work with several other units while contracted with CEI Battalion. The advantages of action research are evident in the five improvements stated above.

The only weakness in this system is time—time away from the very problems needing solutions. Even with time as a detracting factor though, the benefits far outweigh any time loss.

I did not feel it necessary to discuss specific problems or name the issue and strengths. That to me would be disclosing information that is "organizationally" personal and that is not the issue here. The concepts and procedures are the issue, and those have been covered. I found the experience to be personally rewarding and certainly organizationally beneficial.
MINI WORKSHOP ON PERSONAL AWARENESS AND COMMUNICATION
FOR BRANCH CHIEFS AND SECRETARIES

MR. WILLIAM R. TUROCZY, OES0
MR. CHARLES D. GOLDBERG, OL50
AARADCOM, NEW JERSEY

Objectives:
1. Increase Personal Awareness of Self
2. Increase Communications between Supervisors and Secretaries

Method:

Day 1, Time: 3 Hours
1. Participants share their expectations (achieves and avoids).
2. Each individual completes JOHARI WINDOW Self-Rating Form.
3. Consultant presents brief lecturette and clarification of the model.
4. Supervisors and Secretaries form dyads and share their windows with each other and solicit feedback from the group.

Day 2, Time: 3 Hours
1. Review and discussion of Day 1
2. Consultant presents lecturette focusing on giving and receiving feedback, congruent sending, paraphrasing, active listening and "I" messages.
3. Supervisors and Secretaries form dyads and experience paraphrasing, paying attention to significant ideas discussed in lecturette.

Evaluation: A nine question questionnaire was designed to evaluate the workshop. The first six questions were objective answer type with forced answers where 1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Neutral, 4 = Agree, 5 = Strongly Agree, while the last three questions were subjective short answer.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actual Questions and Results</th>
<th>Average Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. I learned something from the JOHARI WINDOW.</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. I learned more about my partner which will help in our relationship.</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Actual Questions and Results (cont'd)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actual Questions</th>
<th>Average Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3. I intend to use the things I learned at this workshop at both my job and home.</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. I feel that active listening, &quot;I&quot; messages, feedback, and congruent sending will help me in my daily work.</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. I felt that the OE Consultants did a fine job in the time that was allotted them.</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. I recommend this workshop for others in the Division.</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Subjective Questions

7. My positive comments about the workshop are:
   - I have been made aware of topics important to my work, some new, some old, but should be emphasized and re-explained.
   - A form of communication in itself. Was important to do as a building block in the OE follow-up.
   - Good experience, liked talking about things I usually don't talk about or experience.
   - Especially liked the subjects discussed in the second session; I felt they were beneficial to "team-work".
   - My first experience in sessions like these. I really enjoyed them. Hope others in Division will participate in the future. I liked the supervisors-secretaries exercises.

8. My negative comments about the workshop are:
   - Need more instruments. How about an instrument to take as homework and then use for discussion the next day?
   - First day was too general and could have been done in half the time.
   - More information needed on self-evaluation and then team evaluation. Possibly (in groups) discussion of specific problems, good teamwork, etc.
   - Too short, moved a little slow; more examples could have been used.
   - Some areas were above my education level.
Subjective Questions (cont'd)

9. Other comments I would like to make are:

___ Keep up the good work. I feel people are getting the message that Division Management Cares.

___ I feel additional time should be allocated for these sessions.

___ More exercises to bring out the people, especially secretaries—in the workshop with supervisor/secretary.
When a user of the OE process is presented with the results of a General Organizational Questionnaire (GOQ) the first reaction might be one of shock, particularly if you have just dumped a stack of Computer printouts on his/her desk. There are those who never give out the actual printouts, there are those who give out all of the printouts, and there are still others who are selective about what they provide.

The purpose of this article is to provide a method whereby you can help the user analyze the GOQ data regardless of the amount you provide.

Persons I have assisted have been most interested in the RANK ORDER listing and the HISTOGRAMS. The appeal of the latter is the visual aspect and the percentage breakout by response. Following this, their interest lies in the comparison of groups displayed on the PLOTS. Prior to providing feedback use different colored pens to outline the various plots to clearly display significant gaps.

The following is a step-by-step procedure that can be given to the user along with GOQ data in order that he/she might make a personal analysis to be followed up with a joint analysis the following day.

**DATA REDUCTION**

**STEP 1:** Study the rank order distribution of responses to the General Organizational Questionnaire and other printouts with comparative data.

**STEP 2:** List those dimensions or items that concern you most. Add to this list those items which might have the greatest potential for improvement.

**STEP 3:** Apply personal judgement to reduce the list down to a workable number of action items using the following criteria:

a. Note those items you believe are "beyond your control" to improve. These may be more appropriately handled by the next level of command with input from you.

b. Line out those items which you feel may be affected by some recent event and are therefore overweighted.

c. Line out those items you feel you could not in any way be committed to personally improving. Think about how you will address this to others.
Some cautions may prove helpful while you are analyzing your data:

a. Don't try to explain something away based on what you "think" was affecting people as they answered the survey.

b. Don't waste time trying to determine who answered what and how.

c. Try not to become defensive.

d. Don't make hasty changes based solely on the survey results. Many are only symptomatic of some underlying difficulty.

STEP 4: Formulate a list of interview questions that you believe must be asked to clarify or amplify on items, particularly those which are of great concern to you and/or any which you may not be personally committed to acting on without more data.

STEP 5: Give some thought to what you can tell your subordinates in the way of positive feedback, to elicit their support for any changes you desire, to get them interested in giving their best in the interviews to follow, to let them know your reactions, and to reaffirm non-attribution.

STEP 6: Give some thought to how you are going to reinforce behavior directed at the desired changes within the organization and anticipate resistance to change on the part of some subordinates.
WHY WE DON'T UNDERSTAND GROUP DYNAMICS
(Social Integration Superimposed over Group Development)

LTC AL COKE
USA OEC&S

For the student of group dynamics the literature has a wealth of data. Groups have been analyzed, directed, regrouped and studied under just about every conceivable situation ranging from men and women isolated on the lonely polar ice caps to the swaying of masses of bodies at rock concerts. What has evolved from the vast amount of information is that groups have identities and can be traced through their developmental stages. What is lacking is our understanding of the social integration of persons into a group and how that relates to the development.

The US Army has been teaching group dynamics for almost four years in its Organizational Effectiveness effort. A special program, known as the Leadership and Management Development Course, has proven to be a dynamic week of experiential learning. The program focuses on group behavior in the work team environment and has become popular at all levels within the Army.

The training of facilitators for the program is tough. An individual becomes expert in group development and group dynamics during the training. However, concept of the individual's integration is not fully explored.

What is lacking in both the program and the training of personnel is the concept of Social Integration. Such a statement is not an indictment against the program but rather a request to update training by molding concepts of group development and individual integration.

To begin, one must first understand the concept of group development. It is simple in theory but sometimes difficult to put into practice. Many models are on the market for a trainer's use. However, as they are shaken out, essentially the same concepts of progressive growth, occasional regression and finally cohesiveness seem to emerge. For ease of understanding, the Fundamental Interpersonal Relation Orientation (FIRO) Model developed by Will Schutz will be used in this paper. To simplify things Schutz (1966) claims individuals and groups develop through three distinct phases. Based on empirical data he has been able to describe the stages as:

Inclusion: The interpersonal need for inclusion is defined behaviorally as the need to establish and maintain a satisfactory relationship with people with respect to interaction and association.

Control: The interpersonal need for control is defined behaviorally as the need to establish and maintain a satisfactory relation with people with respect to control and power.
Affection: The interpersonal need for affection is defined behaviorally as the need to establish and maintain a satisfactory relationship with others with respect to cohesiveness and interdependant activity.

It must be noted that in all cases the term interpersonal is used to indicate a relationship that exists between one member of a collective gathering toward one or more members of the same group. This interpersonal relationship orientation is accurate but may not fully describe a group's dynamics because it is basically one-to-one.

What is interesting is that the needs for interaction, power and love as described by Schutz can be expanded to explain the "dance" persons go through in a group formation to gain status, acceptance and to form bonds. Training to understand this behavior in relationship to group development often falls short. Persons trained in group dynamics tend to explain everything in group terminology and lose sight of the individual as the real focal point of any event.

A review of the stages of group development correlated with the behavior of social integration are shown in Fig. 1.

During the Inclusion stage we see an individual presenting an image that is perceived as positive or negative. A positive self-presentation establishes superiority and hence dominance over others. This dominance produces status because everyone in the group began at a zero point and, in competitive terms, one member now has a leg-up in the contest. Observers react to the attractive person with defensive reluctance. To fully accept the presenting person is a submission of self and an acceptance of dominance. A negative self presentation produces different dynamics than the positive because low esteem and low status produces low-level rejection, low acceptance and passive behavior from group members. These positive or negative presentations are attempts to interface in the dynamics of "in or out" that characterizes INCLUSION.

As group members become more familiar with each other a period of esteem establishment takes place. With esteem the group moves into control. At this point the group members are vying for leadership in a competitive mode. An interesting occurrence must happen for group development to continue. If a person held in high esteem or status discloses in the form of self-depreciation, additional acceptance will occur on the other group members' part. The self-disclosure is a withdrawal from competition and a lowering of status to make the person approachable. The seeking of peer approval while maintaining esteem resolves the issue of control. What then may occur is the disclosure by other lesser esteemed group members until the pecking order is completed.
Fig. 1 - Group Development/Social Integration Correlation Model
When a person, who is unattractive to the group to begin with, takes a turn at self-deprecation it is usually in an attempt to win the approval not achieved during Inclusion. If the unattractive person's disclosure is of a greater magnitude than the perceived low acceptance then that person becomes included in the group. If the disclosure produces only a weak attraction as a peer, the claim of acceptance is not honored by group members and embarrassment occurs. Both the discloser and the listener usually react in an emotional way with the former wondering what else the group wants and the latter wondering why this person ever said the things he/she did.

The issue until now has been "top or bottom" which characterizes Control. By taking out the peer competition the highly esteemed member begins to break down dysfunctional competition and move a group toward cohesive functional behavior.

A special note must be made at this point of the highly esteemed person who does not self disclose. If there is no self-deprecation but there is esteem because of a skill highly valued by the group, a unique situation evolves. What then happens is a power imbalance is established and the group becomes a leader-lead group instead of a synergistic, leaderless group. This type of group is not dysfunctional in terms of efficiency in some situations. However, it quickly becomes task, not relationship, oriented because of the unapproachable behavior of the leader.

Latent attraction occurs between Control and Affection. The defensive reluctance to accept each other is incrementally removed and persons are accepted in a more productive way. Integrative bonds begin to form as interests are shared toward a common goal. More of the arena as described by Ingam and Luft in their JOHARI window is exposed and expanded.

Unfortunately for the embarrassed member the dynamic is not the same. A common theory is that groups tend to police themselves. A group member that does not make it through the attraction stage experiences social amputation; they are physically or psychologically removed from the group. Thus we see the characteristics of "close or far" reinforced during Affection.

At the end of the process is the desired group cohesion. Schutz's theory would have us believe that development is cyclic and begins again on a higher plane. Groups studied by Coke (1977) over a two year period confirm this belief.

To review the FIRO Theory and the concepts of Social Integration in one package should lead to the realization that group trainers need more skills than just the ability to diagnose group processes. Full utilization of resources requires the recognition of the mechanics (process) of group development and an awareness of the integrative behavior of relationships. As group facilitators are trained they must be exposed to the mechanical and integrative dimensions for the full utilization of the human potential of any group for any purpose.
References


SOURCES AND RESOURCES  

UNFINISHED BUSINESS

On pages 77-82 of the April 1979 OE COMMUNIQUE there is an outline for a Time/Meeting Management Workshop which refers to a TV tape on time management featuring Peter Drucker. That is available as a 16mm motion picture film from the Training Aids Support Center (TASC) film library which supports your installation. Its code number is MF61-5529A and the title is THE EFFECTIVE EXECUTIVE SERIES -- MANAGING TIME (color - 25 min - 1970). Another time management film to consider, also available in the TASC system, is THE TIME OF YOUR LIFE (color - 25 min - 1975). Code number is AFIF 300. It is based on Alan Lakein's book HOW TO GET CONTROL OF YOUR TIME AND YOUR LIFE and is an excellent film with wide application to military and civilian organizations.

BETTER LATE THAN NEVER

About six months ago I had a reference request from our man in St. Louis. He had written a speech on OE for his boss to deliver to a civilian organization and he needed the obligatory opening joke. I drew a blank. How embarrassing. Could it be that OE lacks humor?

I asked for an hour to track down an OE joke and began beating the organizational bushes. There were a few that could only be understood by a 5 Zulu. There were a couple that couldn't be repeated in polite company. There were some that fit into both categories. Eventually I learned the bitter truth: CPT Bill Nuffer had been keeping the official OE humor compendium and when he left he took both jokes with him....

Happily I'm now able to provide the following:

QUESTION: How many OESOs does it take to change a light bulb?

   ANSWER: Four - one to change the bulb and three to share the experience.

OESOs IN PRINT

The April 1979 issue of ARMY magazine recounts MAJ Dan McGrew's experiences designing and implementing a transition workshop to deal with the situation of "old boss--new crew." See pages 59-60.

In the 1979 University Associates ANNUAL, CPT Pete Luciano shares the limelight with such luminaries as David Nadler and Roger Harrison. His lecturette, "The Systems View of Organizations: Dynamics of Organizational Change," may look vaguely familiar to some OESOs.
IS ANYBODY OUT THERE?

A segment of our audio cassette collection that has been very popular with students at OECS is the cassettes made by you veterans out in the field. Along with receiving good information and new slants on skills to augment the classroom learning, many of them seem reassured that there is life after OECS....

But it's been a long time since I've heard from you! How about getting out your "To Do" lists right now and scheduling time to make an audio cassette for the OECS Learning Center collection.

CLOSURE

Many thanks to USAREUR OESOs for the photo "collage" from the April OESO workshop in Heidelberg. It is a treasured warm fuzzy -- the next best thing to being there!!

Lynn
Librarian, OECS
NOTE: The practice of printing the roster of names for all previous classes has been discontinued.

Only rosters of classes graduating between issues of the Communiqué will be included.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
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OESO COURSE

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ANDERSON, GARY J. CPT
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FT RILEY, KA 66442

ANDERSON, LEE C. CPT
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A DESCRIPTION OF THE FOUR-STEP PROCESS

Organizational effectiveness is a four-phased process which seeks to improve the functioning of an organization, or unit, through planned, systematic, long-range efforts by applying selected management and behavioral science skills and methods to the total organization. The four steps are:

Assessment. The OESO has been trained to make assessments by using several different methods. They may include observation, interviews, group interviews, questionnaires, surveys, or a combination of all of these methods. The OESO tailors the assessment technique to gather data based on the concerns of the commander. Once the information has been gathered, it is fed back to the commander. This is what you asked me to look at, and here is what I found. In addition, I found these other items that may be of interest to you. The objective of the assessment is to set the gap; i.e., determine where the commander wants the unit to be in the future (changes he desires) and find out where it is now.

Chain of Command Action Planning. Based on the assessment, the commander and the OESO work together to plan what actions should be taken to resolve or reduce problem areas. Sometimes these actions may be solely the commander's. Other times it may involve the OESO as a workshop or meeting facilitator. In every case, the commander decides what is to be done. Once the "what to do" issues are resolved, they attack the "how to" problems: If a 2-day workshop for company commanders and battalion staff officers is agreed on, when can the time be afforded for it?

Implementation. As a result of this planning, the commander initiates those actions that will produce the changes desired. They might be nothing more than a change in office arrangements or training or living facilities, or they may include such things as a workshop on developing/improving problem solving techniques, communication skills, counseling skills, techniques for conducting more productive meetings, etc. OESOs are also trained to facilitate team building and transition of command workshops.

Evaluation/Follow-up. The evaluation that follows an OE operation is not for the purpose of evaluating the unit. It is oriented toward evaluating the effects, good or bad, of the previous efforts. The follow-up portion of this phase addresses appropriate corrective action to rectify something that either happened or failed to happen due to the previous three steps. Follow-up may well lead into a new assessment, thereby making the OE process continuous and long term, as well as systematic.

Because Organizational Effectiveness is an ongoing process, it should not be looked at as a one-shot, quick fix solution to organizational problems. Each step in the process is taken individually and utilized ultimately to improve the total organization in its day to day operations which results in improved readiness.
THE FOUR STEP ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS PROCESS

ASSESSMENT

EVALUATION
FOLLOW-UP

COMMANDER

IMPLEMENTATION

PLANNING