

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
Organizational Effectiveness
Center and School
Fort Ord, California

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The *OE Communique*

The *OE Communique* is published quarterly under the provisions of Chapter 5, AR 310-1. The Mission of the *OE Communique* is to provide state-of-the-art information on the application of the Organizational Effectiveness (OE) process in units and organizations throughout the Army. The *Communique* seeks to provide a forum for the exchange of innovations and lessons learned in the use of OE techniques and to foster the development of research and the evaluation methods aimed at determining the contributions of OE to combat readiness. The *Communique* endeavors to develop closer ties with all OE Consultants and to provide a supplement to their continuing training. A major mission objective is to provide commanders and military and civilian leaders at all levels with practical and timely information for their use in initiating and sustaining OE operations.

Unless specifically stated, the opinions and conclusions expressed in the material presented in this publication are the view of the author and do not necessarily reflect official policy or thinking, nor does it constitute endorsement by any agency of the U.S. Army or Commander, USAOECS. Material may be reprinted if credit is given to the *OE Communique* and the author, unless otherwise indicated.

The use of masculine pronouns, such as "he" and "him" have been avoided in this publication where possible. Such pronouns, when used, refer to both sexes.

Beetle Bailey cartoons are adapted and used with permission of the artist, Mort Walker.

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CPT(P) Lawrence R. Boice

"Traditional scientific method has always been at the very best, 20/20 hindsight. It's good for seeing where you've been. It's good for testing the truth of what you think you know, but it can't tell you where you ought to go, unless where you ought to go is a continuation of where you were going in the past. Creativity, originality, inventiveness, intuition, imagination—'unstickiness,' in other words—are completely outside its domain."

—From *Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance* by Robert M. Pirsig (1974)

"The purpose of scientific method is to select a single truth from among many hypothetical truths. That, more than anything else, is what science is all about. But historically science has done exactly the opposite. Through multiplication upon multiplication of facts, information, theories and hypotheses, it is science itself that is leading mankind from single absolute truths to multiple, indeterminate, relative ones. The major producer of the social chaos, the indeterminacy of thought and values that rational knowledge is supposed to eliminate, is none other than science itself."

—From *Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance* by Robert M. Pirsig (1974)



Letters to the Editor

U.S. ARMY
ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS CENTER AND SCHOOL
FORT ORD, CALIFORNIA 93941

Dear Editor:

To quote the *Communique*: "A major mission objective is to provide commanders. . . at all levels with practical and timely information for their use in initiating and sustaining OE operations."

The OEC's of the 1st Armored Division have been doing this for some time now. However, we now need your assistance to establish a Division wide *OE Communique* distribution plan. Request you send this office thirty-four (34) copies of the *Communique* so we may make distribution to all commanders, battalion level and up, as part of our effort to insure that OE remains alive and well in the 1st AD. Our mailing address is: Cdr, 1st Armored Division, ATTN: AETSKA-OE (G1), APO NY 09326.

Thanks for your help.

ROBERT M. STRICKLAND

MAJ, GS
OEC

DAVID MAGRATH

CPT, GS
OEC

WALTER J. LESIW

SFC, USA
OEC

Dear Editor:

During a temporary duty assignment at Naval Technical Training Center, Treasure Island, San Francisco, to observe the Leadership Management Education and Training (LMET) curriculum of the Navy, I was introduced to "*the Communique*". I was very enthusiastic about the content material since I am soon to be a LMET instructor at the Naval Amphibious School at Coronado, California. I sensed the *Communique* would be valuable for all the instructors which I will be working with. If it is possible, I would desire that the following address be put on the distribution for the *Communique*:

Commanding Officer
Naval Amphibious School
HRMTD
Coronado, CA

LCDR David A. Carroll

Human Resource Management School
Naval Air Station
Millington, TN 38054

Dear Editor:

As the Inspector General of the largest forward deployed logistical command in the US Army, this office has an ongoing need for the kinds of information routinely published in your excellent journal. Since the 21st Support Command is responsible for all POMCUS assets, theater war reserve stocks and conventional ammunition management for the theater, I am certain you can appreciate our thirst for information concerning issues of force modernization, cohesion, training and other matters of contemporary interest.

Request this office be included in routine distribution of your journal. This publication will be utilized for the professional development and edification of our inspection/assistance officers and noncommissioned officers.

JAMES T. VAUGHAN

MAJ, IG
C, Investigations and
Assistance Division

OE Communique Submission Dates

Cut-off dates for material for future issues are as follows:

Issue #	Articles	Cut-Off Dates
		Updates / MACOM Roundups
2-82 (Jun)	31 Mar 82	28 Apr 82
3-82 (Sep)	30 Jun 82	28 Jul 82
4-82 (Dec)	29 Sep 82	27 Oct 82
1-83 (Mar)	29 Dec 82	26 Jan 83

"If you would be a popular conversationalist, have a care to the punctuation in your talk. Keep out the colons, which mean subtopics to what you are saying; and avoid semicolons, which indicate afterthought; but put in plenty of periods, which show you're stopping. And especially use question marks, which invite the other person to start talking."—*Pelham, Georgia Journal*

Editor's Corner

The worst thing about new books is that they keep us from reading the old ones.—**Joseph Joubert (1754-1824)**

Many thanks to all of you who returned the mail-back address verification card contained in the previous issue. Our apologies to those of you who received your copy eight weeks after it was mailed to you. We are taking corrective action, within our postal parameters.

The cumulative index and calendar were popular items. We are out of stock on both, now. Concerning the index, we can *not* honor massive requests for copies of past articles. We'll photostat 1 copy of requested articles, within reasonable limits. Old *Communiques* are collectors' items. We are willing, if demands are great, to reprint popular articles in "Voice from the Past" in future *Communiques*.

We are now printing and distributing 3,500 copies of each issue, which is our authorized upper limit. If you know of copies that are not being utilized most effectively, please let us know, so we can re-route them for maximum organizational impact. Both readers and writers may be interested in knowing that we are now reaching most general officers (Active, Reserve and National Guard), all state adjutants general, students and faculty at the Army War College, CGSC, Sergeants Major Academy, USMA, most ROTC detachments, selected members of White House and Congress, Navy, Air Force, and the international academic/OD community, in addition to OE Consultants.

The demand for the *OE Communique* is a tribute to the quality of OE work being done (and reported) worldwide! Thanks for making the editor's job fun!

—**Larry Boice**

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL
FORT MONROE, VIRGINIA 23651

21 DEC 1981

ATPL-HO

Chief

Dear General Meyer:

The TRADOC Organizational Effectiveness (OE) program is a judicious blend of support to commanders facing the tough challenges of the troop environment and to top management addressing complex systemic problems. A review of reports submitted by TRADOC installations and activities reveals an impressive number of OE operations of exceptional quality and broad scope.

The OE Center and School continues to provide the Army with well-trained and highly skilled OE consultants. The ability of the school to integrate state-of-the-art technology and methodology into the curriculum, and to update fielded OE consultants, is exceptionally commendable. This initiative has led directly to the Army's OE program being recognized by many experts in the field as being in the forefront of the Organizational Development effort nation-wide.

Our plan for the future is to use OE against the toughest problems within TRADOC, such as force modernization, mobilization planning and support of Army cohesion initiatives. We must better integrate OE with other management technologies to form functional teams capable of addressing complex issues from all perspectives.

The future, with its challenges to commanders and to our Army, demands maximum return on each asset invested. Organizational Effectiveness is an asset which will aid in achieving the goals of TRADOC and the Army.

Sincerely,

Glenn K. Otis

GLENN K. OTIS
General, United States Army
Commanding

1 Incl
TRADOC OE Annual Command
Summary (FY 81)

General E. C. Meyer
Chief of Staff
United States Army
Washington, DC 20310



“A Time of Change.” A speech presented by General E. C. Meyer, Army Chief of Staff, before the World Affairs Council on 24 September. The basic thrust of the speech is twofold: the changes taking place in the Army and military scene and their cumulative effect of causing “multiple gaps” in defense programs. Both the changes and gaps are discussed extensively. Speech provided to the *OE Communique* by the Office of the Chief of Public Affairs, DA.

A Time of Change

Remarks by
GENERAL EDWARD C. MEYER
Chief of Staff, United States Army
to World Affairs Council, Boston, Massachusetts
Thursday, 24 September 1981

I notice that the agenda you have here is very similar to one for a military operation.

First of all, you have a meeting engagement which takes place back in the corner back there where everybody sort of feels one another out over drinks, and you try to decide who you're going to soften up, or butter up prior to the luncheon.


Then what follows next, which is where we are now, is sort of the central battle. For those of us who are in the military business, that can be either offensive or defensive. In the military arena that's based primarily on intentions. Today, it's dependent upon the invited speaker, and that's me, so I'll try to make sure it's not too offensive.

Finally, there's the exploitation phase of the combat, and that's the period in which hopefully we're able to succeed. I would hope that the question and answer period here offers a similar opportunity for exploitation. At that point in time, there might be subjects of interest which I haven't covered which you may be interested in—noncontroversial items like the drafting of women, the morality of war, enhanced radiation warheads, the AWACS, European pacifism, cost escalation, volunteer Army, and a couple of other low key issues like that—which you might like to discuss.

What differs here from the battlefield is that, hopefully at the end there aren't any losers, that I have been able to fill a gap for you or provide you with some food for thought. Similarly, I hope I'm able to gather in your ideas of where it is we are and where we're going.

It's an exciting period for the Army. I say that regardless of your political affiliation out there. On January 20th, as I stood beside the President of the United States, the Commander-in-Chief, at the inauguration, as American soldiers passed by, the President of the United States stood there and sang all of the words to the Army song, or “Caissons go rolling along.” Now you've got to admit that does something good for the heart of the soldier when you realize the last five presidents have had a naval background (laughter).

One of my illustrious predecessors indicated that generals should never pass up the opportunity to remain silent (laughter). Well, I'm not going to follow that advice because it came at a period of time when there was an element of self-inflicted wounds on the part of many generals, and it was also a period of time in which, as a result of Vietnam, it may have been inappropriate for generals to be speaking on many issues. But I feel that I have a responsibility as a custodian of



national power, to speak out, to report on the stewardship of those of us who are developing our military forces for the future, and to assure you that we are using the discretionary federal funding provided to us responsibly.

It is not necessary for me to review with this particular group the background or the rationale which underwrites the need for military forces. The mandate that came from our society last fall is an indication of the support and need felt for adequate military forces. I believe that Armed Forces in their role of providing disciplined, trained and ready units are a fundamental prerequisite for the continued existence of this Nation, particularly if we want to ensure that our freedoms and our liberties are kept intact.

Now that's not to say that there aren't differences of views as to what that Army should look like, and what that military force should look like. There are, in fact, honest differences about how much is enough. Is this the right strategy? Is this the right tactic? Are these the right weapons? But the fundamental rationale for the maintenance of military power doesn't need to be explained to this audience.

capability to engage in a war of more indeterminate length rather than just one of a short and violent exchange. And third, it accepts the need to take action under periods of tension, which gives you an opportunity to use your reserve components, your Guard, and your United States Army Reserve, as effective components of the nation's total deterrent power. This framework obviously requires that you have adequately sized forces ready across the full spectrum of warfare from counter-terrorism all the way through strategic nuclear exchange. That key linkage between our force capabilities, the forces in being, and the strategy is one of very real concern, and is one that must be brought into order. Otherwise, we will have the President and the leadership of our Nation proposing ways in which they will go about national security without the military strength—as one of those arrows in the quiver of national security means—to back it up.

• **Gap two is the gap that has to do with our current capabilities and those of our likely adversaries.** It's the issue of our comparative strength—in quantity and quality. In the past, we have spoken time and again of the clear fact that the Soviets had improved numerically over us. Today it's not just an issue of numbers, but also of quality. We must close that qualitative gap because there's no way, in my judgment, that we will be able to compete on man-for-man or system-for-system basis. **What we need to do is to be able to use the technological capability of this Nation, the inventive ability of this Nation, to get us out in front in those areas where we can have advantage so that we aren't using resources merely to create a mirror image force.** In the long run such a mirror image force would not be the right kind of force for us to respond with, simply because our political, social, and geographical posture is so different.

Why does the gap exist? What happened, in the case of the Army, is that the resources made available in the 1960's and early 1970's were resources that were consumed in Vietnam. The 1970's were, for us, an era of development. At this point in time the United States Army is in a position where it has the opportunity to make a qualitative leap forward to ensure that we have the kind and type of land combat equipment that we urgently need.

Now, if I read the Christian Science Monitor and the Wall Street Journal and everything else, the biggest criticism cited is that we're goldplating. I'd like to talk about goldplating for a minute if I might, because I think that's a rightful concern of every American citizen. It's also a rightful concern for the Chief of Staff of the whole United States Army, and I am concerned about it. If it were possible to buy cheap, dirty weapons that worked, I would buy cheap, dirty weapons that work. But I always reflect on my experience in the 40th Division when we were sent into Korea for the first time and came up against a Chinese tank. Now first of all, you've got to remember that a soldier, an infantryman, doesn't have any armor on. He's just got a little epidermis there. And by the time he decides that he has enough courage to stand up and aim a rocket launcher at a tank, he's already used up most of his courage (laughter). At that point in time, as many of you will recall, we had a 2.36-inch rocket launcher. For those of us who finally got enough courage to stand up and fire, we saw the rocket bounce off the front of that Chinese tank. Most of your muscles tightened up very, very quickly, I'll tell you that (laughter). So I would tell you that the difference between a 2.36 and 3.5-inch rocket launcher, that 1.14 inches which gave that weapon on the battlefield the capability of being successful against

the threat is hard for me to characterize as goldplating. It was absolutely essential.

My position is that I am not going to send American soldiers off to war with equipment that's inadequate to the task. Now you may therefore flail me for goldplating or whatever term you choose, but the determinant of what kind of equipment we use is not based on anything other than what the threat is and what that then dictates we must give the Soldier to respond with. So that's the task that we have today regarding the qualitative-quantitative gap.

• **Gap three is the need for a force that's responsible in a more flexible mode for the future.** From the very beginning of time, armies have been criticized for preparing for the last war, and then not being prepared to fight whatever war was at hand or being unable to respond to the needs of the national authorities. Well, I will tell you that, at times in the past, the Army had its own fleet. I mean one belonging to the Army. We were able to be moved around from square A to square B by telling ships to line up out here, and we got aboard them and we were able to get from one place or the other. Today that's not true. And our fields of employment are projected afar. If you want to think of our overseas commitments, we have a larger percentage of our Army committed overseas in peacetime than any Army since the holy Roman empire. The demands that places on noncommissioned officers and families in leaving and going back and forth occupies the time of an awful lot of people on the Army staff. They're looking at how we can put units together and keep them together for longer periods of time so they develop that unity and cohesion that you need in successful units. That kind of oversea commitment is a major factor impacting on our development of the right kind of force for the future.

That force must rely on the Air Force for rapid airlift, and the Navy for rapid sealift in order to get where it is that we must go. And for the future if you go back to the concept that is being pronounced in strategies as far as a more global region is concerned, that means that we must have larger and more responsive strategic mobility, both air and sea. And that must be a high priority. The resource envelopes, therefore, are going to demand that some hard choices be made to ensure that the forces we have are able to get somewhere to do something to respond to the challenges.

Now that's not all that needs to be done. The Army must make certain that what we ask them to lift is minimized as much as possible in weight so that we minimize the demands made for mobility resources, and we're doing that. At Fort Lewis we've created a test division where we're taking the kind of technology that many of the companies in this area produce, and trying them out to see what we can do to make the forces lighter, more flexible, and better trained to boot. **We're doing that at Fort Lewis so we can export what we learn there throughout the entire Army.** It will hopefully yield more flexible forces which can respond not just in central Europe, not just in Northeast Asia, not just in Southwest Asia, but around the world. And that's an essential focus for the force of the future. The flexibility gap, in part a function of our having totally focused force decisions on Europe, must be closed. Our forces must be more flexible if they're to be able to respond across the full spectrum of warfare. And that is a serious deficiency that must be corrected.

• **The fourth gap is the resource gap, and that's one that all of us face—I don't care what you're business is, I don't care whether you're just running the checkbook, or whether I'm trying to decide whether I can pay for my daughter's education at a university or**

to the challenge of a changing future. **This is all with the purpose of helping this nation manage change, instead of being managed by change, in this very difficult decade ahead.**

That's all I have to say, and I'll be glad to take any questions now if you like. (Applause)

Questions and Answers

Q: We have been demoralized of course during the Vietnamese war, and what happened was that programs such as ROTC, and the like, showed a falloff in participation. How do we stand in that area today, and below that echelon, what are your concerns about registration?

A: First of all, let me talk the basic success of the volunteer force—I guess that's the real issue. As far as the quality of the soldiers that we're able to attract into the active component Army at the present time, in 1980 about 50% of our nonprior service coming in were high school graduates. This year 80% are high school graduates—a higher percentage of high school graduates than we've had in the past. That's in the active component. It is possible with the educational incentives that are currently ongoing to bring in, in my judgment, both the quantity and quality of soldier that you need in a restricted size Army—780,000—purely through educational benefits, bonuses as long as it's possible to do that. If you expand the size of the Army to meet the global needs that the Reagan administration has proposed, and if you expanded the Army to ensure that you had the base here so that you didn't have such a large percentage of your soldiers overseas and you were able to retain your key middle grade leaders, noncommissioned officers and officers, then I don't see any solutions if the Army goes above about 800,000 in end strength to be able to do that purely through monetary means.

The three areas in which the volunteer force has been a failure are manning the Guard, manning the United States Army Reserve and in providing a trained, manpower tool. Seven years ago we had a million, trained young men and women in a manpower pool that was available if we went off to war. Today, we have 200,000. So the gap that exists in the Guard, the Reserve, and the trained manpower pool is the real gap as far as the adequacy.

On the question, are they smart enough to be able to handle the equipment, the answer is clearly yes. The equipment is being made simpler instead of more difficult. You remember when you got your first color television and you had all those dials over there where you had to get the hue and the tint and the color and all those kinds of things? Today I can punch a button and get the picture to come out right.

The real problem gets back to the maintenance of that equipment, the maintenance of it in the rear. That's where we need quality NCOs and quality military leaders, and that's where the focus has to be. To get back to Meyer's basic premise, it doesn't matter whether you have a conscript or a volunteer force, if you don't have the critical NCOs and officers to lead it—that cadre force—you can't have an army. We can solve the other problems at the last minute. Our country can solve the problem. But you can't solve the problem of keeping the middle grade leader, so that's where we're trying to focus our responses.

Q: Are the critics of the M-1 tank fair?

A: No. Absolutely unfair. They're absolutely unfair. First of all, the two basic issues are cost overruns and operational readiness. You can name anything else you want, but let's just talk about two simple things like that, you know: something like a 1½ million dollar overrun per copy and the fact that the big hunk of junk won't do its job (laughter). Those are the kinds of challenges that you have to respond to. First, basically, in the kind of industry that you're talking about, there's a greater inflation rate than there is in the inflation rate experienced throughout society. So a large portion of the increase is pure inflation as far as the increase price on the tank is concerned. It's actually gone up over that period time about \$30,000 if you went back to constant dollars. So the inflated price cited those scare stories, taking a 1972 figure and comparing it with a 1986 figure. I challenge anybody in industry here to compare anything from '72 with '86—a Hershey bar went from 10¢ to 25¢—you know, the same size Hershey bar. It's hard to be able to compare those kinds of things. But that's the answer.

And as far as the capability of the system itself, don't believe me, believe the sergeants. Nobody believes generals—I believe sergeants. And the sergeants who are manning the M-1 say that it's the finest tank they've ever been in, that it is easier to maintain than in the past. The Israelis who've been down there, the Germans who've been there, the French who've been down there, the British who've been down there, all of those who look at it say it's the best tank they've ever seen. So I just refuse to accept that criticism—I accept the criticism because I have to, but it's invalid.

Q: About the neutron warhead, if I were in Germany, I think I'd rather have neutron warheads seeing the Russian tanks at my back. I hear that Russia has allocated \$700 million propaganda to keep us from deploying them. Why don't we go on a counter-propaganda war and show the intelligence we have (inaudible) the claim that the Soviets have made, and win the political battle so we can act freely?

A: I think the point you raised, whether you're for or against the enhanced radiation weapon, is valid as far as the Soviets are concerned. There are times when you know you're getting their attention because immediately propaganda begins to go out. It happened 2½ years ago when the enhanced radiation weapon first came out, and it's happening profoundly now in the way in which they're influencing public opinion in Germany and elsewhere.

I think the other point that you raise is correct, and that we've just had the first shot in that response, sending to NATO declassified facts on the Soviet threat. I think it is being sent to our allies over there so that they could begin that kind of a discussion. It's hard to talk to this threat when you don't understand or appreciate its dimensions.

Q: General, in trying to maintain military readiness, is chemical warfare getting much attention from the Army today?

A: The defensive aspect of chemical warfare is getting more attention that it has in the past. We began a 5-year program in the development of defensive overgarments, types of clothes, the new gas masks, and all of that. Hopefully, we'll never have to go to war or ever have to use chemicals. But one thing that you have to know is that the Soviets have large amounts of chemical weaponry. These create a hazard to us and, without an equivalent threat in our hands, permits them to operate in such a manner that they are not restricted by having to wear chemical overgarments which reduces your

Force Modernization Our Toughest Systemic Challenge

LTC Bob Radcliffe (TRADOC)

MAJ Mary Mudd (TRADOC)

"CG would like you to explore the possibility of the OE people providing some assistance in gaining insights into how the Army might better cope with modernization."

CDR TRADOC to DCS Combat Development, 21 Oct 81.

A mission has been given to Organizational Effectiveness Consultants throughout the Army: to become involved in the systemic issue of Force Modernization as it affects the Army and your organization. Your challenge is to seek out, gain acceptance by, and provide support to, the people who are addressing the issue of force modernization. Of all the complex systemic issues facing the Army in the decade of the 80's, force modernization is the most vital. It transcends all that we do; it must be accomplished in conjunction with all other missions. It will increase the challenge of our training and maintenance, and it will test our personnel and logistical support systems. It is already upon us: with the conversion and equipping of the initial Abrams Tank Battalions in the Third Infantry Division in January 82, force modernization is a reality and demands our attention and immediate efforts. The results of our labor will be an Army truly awesome in its capabilities.

The missions for Organizational Effectiveness Consultants will not be easy. You will be required to demonstrate expert as well as process consulting skills. You will operate in areas where little is available in terms of precedent or research. You will be required to study, to understand the systems and processes in effect, yet still be innovative in developing solutions to the unique challenges encountered. There are incalculable benefits to be gained for your unit and, most importantly, the Total Force Army.

What is force modernization? A simple definition is all those actions taken to describe, develop, acquire, deploy and support new or improved weapon systems, supporting systems, and organizations. This includes the planning for and redistribution of displaced systems and equipment. But to truly appreciate the complexity of modernization, one must understand that over 400 new systems will be introduced into the Army, displacing many systems in the active force for redistribution to the Reserve, National Guard, or Foreign Military Sales programs. These systems are as large as a new field bakery. The systems can be fielded by the thousands or by the handful. Their introduction singularly would be difficult, but the fielding of the interrelated sum is extremely complex. The resource impact in the next five years is (conservatively) estimated at 108 billion for procurement and 10 billion for operations and support. During the same period, 18,000 military and 16,000 civilian spaces will appear in the force structure as a direct result of modernization. In addition, 1.5 billion dollars is programmed for force modernization-related military construction.

Based upon the doctrine of the airland battle, major organizational changes have resulted in the Heavy Division (Mech and Armor Divisions), and new organizations are being developed for virtually all other Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) units from

squad to echelons above corps. Organizational changes are not limited to combat units. They will effect virtually all types of units and will impact in all theaters where our forces are deployed.

As this process evolves, the Army will go through a period of transition where new organizations, using new tactical doctrine will exist with a mix of new and old systems. This phenomenon will further challenge the system as the force modernization manager attempts to provide personnel, training and logistical support to units with this "high/low" mix of equipment. Change will be exponential (versus linear) over time, as more and more materiel systems come off production lines and are fielded, thus triggering more and more organization conversions. The cumulative impact of this massive change still remains to be assessed. Change will be experienced like a bow wave, building in magnitude over time. There is no question that its impact will be profound, perhaps to the point that fundamental norms, and, perhaps the values of the Army as an institution, will be affected. More must be done to calculate the total effect of this change as new materiel systems and organizations impact on the people of our Army and on the existing maintenance, personnel, supply and training systems.

Across the Army, senior leaders are at this time wrestling with the complex issue of how to most effectively manage force modernization. (Editor's note: Conference hosted by OECS, "Approaches to Organizational Design/Redesign," 22-26 February 1982, involved several of the key players in the force modernization arena.) This management issue cuts across the whole of the Army from the DA/DOD arena to the platoon receiving its new tanks. Each MACOM has its own unique responsibilities: for DARCOM—equipment acquisition, development and fielding; for TRADOC—materiel development, organization design, development of tactical doctrine and training of personnel in the base; for USAREUR, FORSCOM, WESTCOM and 8th Army—integration of organizational doctrine and equipment without degrading readiness. In the final analysis, the whole of the Army will be affected, from the recruiter to the division commander, from the PLL clerk to a civilian working at Lexington Bluegrass Depot, we will all deal with and feel the effects of modernization.

As Organizational Effectiveness Consultants, we possess unique skills for providing support in this most challenging (and exciting!) process. Our role in force modernization will be limited only by our imagination. Each of us must use our initiative, creativity, and expertise when seeking out the people in our organizations who are working the issues of modernization. We must combine our unique abilities and perspectives with a thorough understanding of the systems which are integral to the modernization effort. We must

“Man, You Ain’t Seen Nothing Yet!”

Futurist **Joseph Coates**, a Washington consultant, discussed the implications of societal changes for the Army at the 1981 Worldwide Public Affairs Officer Luncheon. He identified changes in demographics, national values, and technology which he feels will change the Army of the future. Text provided to the *OE Communique* by **CPT Pat Hawes**, Professional Developmental Branch, DA Public Affairs.

Odgen Nash has commented that progress is great. It may have just gone a little too far. That’s a point of view which I reject. I prefer a view reflected in an anecdote about a visitor to Washington hopping into a cab, and a cab driver was taking him down the street, and they passed the Archives.

Under the figure of Cleo sitting there is inscribed, “**The past is prologue.**” And he said, as people will, “I wonder what that means?”

The cab driver shot back, “**Man, you ain’t seen nothing yet.**” I think that’s the view of the future which I want you to take. “Man, you ain’t seen nothing yet,” and your problem, in part, is to be prepared for that.

In that sense, people have two views about preparing for a future. There is an older view, a fully legitimate view in the last century and perhaps the early part of this century, a view that says that the veil which covers the face of the future is woven by the hand of mercy. That we’re far better off not knowing what the future holds. I reject that.

I reject that because it doesn’t reflect the reality of our times. We advocate the ability to understand the future; we advocate the ability to see the alternatives. We advocate the ability to see the way those alternatives are going to develop.

But most importantly, we have a commitment and an awareness of our own efficacy in molding and shaping that future. **We are not passive bystanders in an unfolding cinema where we are condemned to watch the future unfold.**

The future is much more protean, much more shapeless, much more the subject of our own intervention, and therefore, what I want to talk to you about today are some of those factors that are shaping the future and hint at some of the ways in which your and others’ intervention may cause it to go in one direction or the other.

I want to talk about three things. **Demographic change, value change and some technological change** in American society.

• **First, the reason for selecting demography is it is the closest thing to rock-hard information that we have about the future.** If you’re going to be an adult in the year 2000, you’re already born, and that’s a key factor.

We can see the population shifts and patterns and begin to plan for and against them. Right now, we have a surplus of entry-level labor. That should work to your advantage. But following close behind that is a baby-bust, which is going to create a very real problem in the next 15-20 years in finding entry level labor.

That entry level labor is going to be in strong competition, and you’re going to be in strong competition with every other institution in society.

On the other hand, people your age—and there is perhaps a 15 to 20 year age spread among you—people your age have entered a deficit market. You’ve experienced a period of our economic growth in which there is a great demand, a great upward mobility, continual available space all the way up the socio-economic ladder. We have now entered a period in which that no longer is true. We are about to enter a period in which there will be two, three, five contenders for every middle level and senior job.

“We are not passive bystanders in an unfolding cinema where we are condemned to watch the future unfold.”

In the next 15 years, we have to invent the terminology and a social system that permits us to what we now call downgrade people because the only way we can keep the ferment in our society is by turnover. We must therefore be able to relieve some of some responsibilities and move others into their place.

These are some of the things that come out of the baby boom and the baby bust, and they are fully predictable. Another factor of equal importance to you is that 25 percent of the net population growth in the United States today is from immigration.

Those immigrants are not European, northern or southern. They are from Asia, Africa; they are from the parts of the world that have the greatest cultural distance from our own established system, and yet many of them are going to be the people who will populate the population of your recruits in the future. They will comprise your officer corps in the future—at least, their children will.

But perhaps the most exciting demographic trend in America today—and this is the sort of thing that truly is exciting because it represents a major national change—is the movement of women into the work force.

You see it in the Army. You see it in the Navy, Air Force—in all the services. But that’s not an aberration. That’s a fundamental change in the structure of the economy.

Women are moving into a position of parity and equity in every sector. They are demanding education. They are demanding equality of access.

Now, going along with that is the decline in the birth rate; the decline in family size; alternative living arrangements; alternative senses of award. The Army cannot persist in the future treating women as if they are all members or certainly ought to be members of *Saturday Evening Post* cover families.

nity and collective action, understanding a personal element are all the important things of a future, and one can see this wave of concerns in corporate America in terms of the enormous swelling and the differentiating roles of personnel offices, mid-management training and so on.

Now, in many cases, what is happening is the wolf is acquiring sheep's clothing. That's all right so long as you can function in dealing with these people, it's okay. You don't have to believe that's true, but as managers, one has to accommodate to that reality about the future.

So one can see that there are perhaps four views in the work force of the future—the traditional southern, rural, Appalachian Baptist view of the world—order, structure, God, religions, so on; the industrial view—work hard, keep your nose clean and you get rewarded; the view that says cooperation and participation, openness, the human element; and then a fourth, a tiny small view that says, no, the real essence is understanding the world, a cognitive view, enhancing yourself. The movement is from here to here to here.

I'd point out to you, to those of you who find this industrial view congenial and desire to keep it, that some recent research on corporate executives—troubled corporate executives, people who have made it—shows that, in general, they have three emotions. First, let me tell you how you get at these emotions. You ask your troubled executive to keep a log book.

The person who did this research found something very interesting. He had them write down in a log book, "Whenever you have an emotion, enter it in the log if you know its name and write a little description of the situation in which it occurred."

Well it's interesting. **Senior executives who are troubled—and there are large numbers of them—reflect only three basic emotions: anger, fear and boredom.**

And as a footnote to those of you who are married and women in the audience, one of the studies extended to their wives. They also have three interesting emotions: anger, rage (notice, that's anger squared)—and depression.

Well, anyway, there are limits to the model which has formed your view of the world, and the evidence is all around us that that model is not going to persist in its present form—healthy or unhealthy—as the mass view of society.

Let's turn then to the third element that I want to alert you to. Again, the theme that I want to play out is that these factors are real. They are anticipatable. They are real enough that they should become central planning factors in your view of the future and your preparation of the future.

• **So let's turn for a moment to the world of technology.** Perhaps the most exciting development of the world of technology is the movement of American society to an information based society. The dominant commodity in our world is no longer coal and corn and oil. It's no longer wheat. It's nothing that comes out of the ground. It's nothing that's grown, and it's nothing that is manufactured.

The dominant commodity in American society is **information**. Fifty to 55 percent of the work force, people like you and me that comprise that work force—are in the information business, and that's very interesting from several points of view because what we've essentially done is built a society in the last six or seven decades based on an industrial model—a model which says, what's important is the ownership of goods; what's important is manufactured; what's important are physical things, and we got that all in place, and it's

instantly obsolescent because now what's important is knowledge, information, the means of generating information, handling it, preserving it, storing it, packaging it, using it—the new dominant commodity is that information, and every institution is dissonant with it.

“The dominant commodity in American society is information.”

Let's talk a little bit about some of that dissonance. For example, we've built a civil rights body of legislation that says women, blacks, handicapped, all kinds of oppressed groups have access. What do they have access to? They've basically been guaranteed access to factors and, in an information society, the factor is not the dominant physical plant because telecommunications now—the technology of the information society—is making it practical to work not in those high-rise factories in the middle of every city, but in suburban work centers and at home.

So the very time that we've built the structure of equity, we find that it's undercut by this fundamental society of transformation.

“The Army can't be anything other than a mirror of that society.”

Now, why focus on society at large? **Because the Army can't be anything other than a mirror of that society.** There are strong limitations on how far you can deviate from the central pattern of society so we're trying to get at what's happening in the future. We're going to be information rich, and that's going to change our lives and, therefore, the Army can't persist in a system which is information poor.

We're going to be information open, and the Army can't persist in a world which is information closed.

We're moving into a world in which information is a free good, virtually. We can't have a system in which it is an expensive commodity. We are moving into a world in which decisions are made on a plenary basis because people are, will be and will insist on being informed. The Army can no longer operate on an authoritarian model which says, "We know better."

Opening up the system is going to occur, and the only question, is it painful or is it excruciating? Those are your choices. The system will open because technology makes it possible, the social ambience demands it, and the political movement insists upon it.

What does that mean? Let's get some details. Well, first of all, the technology we're talking about is a technology which is increasing achievement. Typically in the next decade, two, three, five, eight percent of families will have a **work-study center**. Now, you grew up with the term "rec-room." Rec-room is a thing of the past. It's going to be work-study center.

By the turn of the century, I anticipate the average household will have a big enough investment in telecommunications to equal your investment now in an automobile—\$5,000 worth, \$8,000 worth, \$10,000 worth of hardware in a mobile household, and what's that going to be used for? It's not going to be schlock entertainment. If no one told you, CBS, ABC and NBC are dead. Television viewing peaked in 1975-1976, and it's been on the

Combating Ineffective Communications

CPT(P) David J. Ozolek (NTC)

Within the military, where there is a need for the rapid dissemination of large quantities of information, communications which are concise, complete, and coherent are essential to the successful accomplishment of each assigned mission. However, the effectiveness of military communications is often hampered by a linguistic phenomenon becoming increasingly evident within the services, as well as in many other technically or service-oriented organizations. The continuing emergence of a peculiar dialect known as "bureaucratese" poses a difficult communications problem which commanders, staff officers, and organizational effectiveness specialists at every level must make a deliberate, concerted effort to overcome.

The compartmental structure of the military staff, with its division into specific functional areas, provides a fertile ground ripe for sowing the seeds of bureaucratese. A technical language is necessary for the conduct of business within a specialty, and specialists who are daily inundated with technical communications from their peers are inclined to lose sight of the fact that those outside the specialty are unable to understand their language. When the specialists involved in military staff communications do not separate the need for technical language within the specialty from the need to communicate in a common language with the non-technicians of the larger organization they support, the potential for gross communications failure exists.

Imagine yourself a task force commander after several days of continuous operations. You have called together your staff to update you on the unit's capability to continue operations. As you sit in the dusty briefing area of your command post, you sleepily focus your attention on a few of the points your staff introduces:

There are three avenues of approach into the division sector capable of supporting the attack of motorized rifle division-sized elements. . .the enemy has nuclear and chemical capability. . .off-road speeds reduced by as much as 50 percent. . .BMNT tomorrow is 0547. . . .

The task force is currently at 84 percent strength, with Team Alpha at 137 and 5, Team Bravo 143 and 6, Team Charlie. . .17K, 36C, and 59F shortages continue, but replacements have been requisitioned. Higher says to expect, at best, 60 percent fill over the next three to seven days. . .We can expect casualties of 20 to 40 percent depending on enemy NBC employment. . . .

Big boys at 50 percent ammo and 40 percent fuel, on the average, except in Team Bravo where ammo is down to about 20 percent of basic load. . . You can expect maintenance to continue to be a headache because DS experiences shortages of Class IX. . .Romeo problems continue, some teams down to 70 percent operational victors because of it. . .Things look rough, but we might be able to handle it if we get a little support from higher. . . .

As the last of these briefers concludes and departs, you take stock of what you have actually learned about the status of your unit from the information they have given you. You conclude that although somewhere in that briefing the information they have gathered is critical to your ability to decide on a course of action to follow, the language in which your staff communicated the information to you has severely limited your ability to assimilate it and thus has significantly decreased its


immediate value to you. You are left to ponder what might be at the source of your unit's internal communication failure.

Since you feel that somewhere in the staff's grasp lies the information you need, you conclude that the problem probably does not center in the staff's ability to gather raw information. Your conclusion is strengthened by your knowledge of the staff's degree of training and experience, and you feel confident that you are dealing with a group of highly proficient specialists in their individual fields. However, you also appreciate that a high degree of specialization can become a hindrance to organizational effectiveness, when specialists become so thoroughly enraptured with the technical aspects of their field that they lose the ability to communicate with those who do not share their technical expertise.

In order to combat bureaucratese, the commander must first recognize it. If bureaucratese were defined by a native speaker, the definition would probably read: "the replication of normal speech patterns obfuscated with the inclusion of anagrams, technicalisms and polysyllabic verbalizing devices (hereafter referenced as ATP's), and/or compound-multipurpose conjunctions; phrased in passive, qualified, and/or circular structures to interface with the anomalies and/or specific responsibilities of the specialty while denying responsibility for same. Modificationizing of words or lateral transference of parts of speech is authorized." You probably recognize the sound.

What can account for the large numbers of otherwise proficient specialists who lapse into such convoluted speech patterns? The answer lies in an understanding of the profiles of the three major personality types who are predisposed to adopting this sort of officious gibberish. Although these personality types rarely exist in pure form, they can be easily recognized in almost any administrative organization, and left undetected or unchallenged, can quickly cause degeneration in the communication network of the organization they inhabit.

1. The Monkey-see, Monkey-doer. The first and perhaps most widespread of the bureaucratese speakers is the character who unwittingly imitates the speech patterns of others. Once initiated in the anomalies of technical language, he simply is unable to turn them off



First, it appears that your intelligence officer has done little, if anything with the intelligence reports that have been passed down from your Brigade headquarters. The information he has provided you—generalities on avenues of approach into the division sector and the NBC capabilities of the enemy—has little practical value in planning task force-level operations. The analysis of the situation from higher headquarters is nice background information, but it needs to be condensed and fleshed out with locally procured information which the intelligence officer is certain to have available. He seems unwilling or unable to put the information together in his own words to provide you in specific terms an indication of the enemy's capabilities and probable courses of action. There are indications here that this officer may, in addition to his communications problem, be suffering from an inability to gather and process raw data. As far as communication ability—he is an obvious **monkey-doer**.

And the adjutant—is he giving you information you can use? In all probability, you will forget almost as soon as you are briefed, the overall strength percentage figure he has given you and the laundry list of individual company team statistics. Because of continually changing task organizations, you probably didn't know what the teams are supposed to have, anyway, and you are now forced to return to this **empire builder** for a clarification on what this information means in terms of combat effectiveness. He has attempted to impress you with the wealth of detail he has at his fingertips, but in actuality he has done you a disservice by complicating your life with needless information and forcing you to come to him for a translation, thus seemingly strengthening his position in your eyes and increasing his indispensability to you.

The same criticism applies to his use of a string of specialty codes without a translation of their meaning. He probably does not expect you to have an adjutant's day-to-day knowledge of the codes, and once again is attempting to show you just how necessary he is to the organization.

The large, qualified swags on casualties and replacements provide him with a comfortable range; if the actual figures fall anywhere within the widely separated extremes he has provided, he can claim the accuracy of a wizard. As far as planning information you can use to anticipate your chance of success in future operations, however, this mass of information is worthless. In sum, the information this officer has at his fingertips is vital to your assessment of your unit's capabilities; he simply needs to package it in a usable form.

Finally, your logistician suffers from a severe fondness for jargon. As with your adjutant, it is obvious that this officer has done his homework and could offer you a wealth of crucial information, if he were to edit it properly. What exactly is a "big boy," a "romeo," "tango," or "victor," or any of the other nonsensical terms that have crept into this staff communication? What, in terms of mobility does "40 percent fuel" mean; how many miles or kilometers can you expect your vehicles to travel before they run out of fuel, and how many rounds can they fire before their magazines are empty?

Note the built-in excuses preparing you for failure: your maintenance support is experiencing problems, and there is the implication that "higher" may not be fully cooperative. If your unit does fail to complete its assigned mission, the failure cannot be attributed to this officer, if he can help it, for he has protected himself with a **verbal wall** composed of ambiguity, jargon, and the transfer of responsibility to agencies outside his

span of control. And—unfortunately—in many units he can get away with it simply because his commander is unaware of his strategy, or unwilling, or unprepared to deal with it.

What can the commander do about the problem of ineffective staff communications resulting from an infestation of bureaucratise? Fortunately, a simple but effective strategy of establishing specific communications formats, relentless questioning, and constant editing of staff work can serve as an effective deterrent to the confusion and incoherence unchecked bureaucratise can breed.

The commander must clarify for his staff the essential information he needs and the format in which he feels it will be most useful to him. The primary function of the staff is to filter the tremendous amount of information that comes into the organization and to extract only the key items for the commander's consumption in easily digestible bits. Briefings riddled with unnecessary raw statistics or incomprehensible bureaucratise both waste the commander's valuable time and distract him from the key issues at hand. A commander who fails to specify what information he wants to hear and exactly how he wants to hear it leaves himself vulnerable to the verbal inefficiency of a staff with a predisposition to bureaucratise. The best defense against staff-produced bureaucratise is to pre-empt it, and the establishing of specific communications guidelines is a necessity for accomplishing this end.

The commander's next step is to confront the bureaucratise-speaking staff officer and ferret out, through pointed and incessant questions, the valuable information the staff officer's convoluted communications obscure. To be an effective questioner the commander must genuinely believe that the failure to communicate does not lie in his own inability to **comprehend**, but rather in the speaker's inability to **transmit** clearly. The commander must not be embarrassed or the least bit hesitant to ask what may seem to be inane or simplistic questions, if they are essential to insuring his comprehension of the issue at hand. When the bureaucratise speaker finally realizes that the questioning will not let up until he provides a clearly worded, comprehensive answer, he will finally surrender the information sought by the commander. Being the malleable and imitative creature the bureaucratise speaker tends to be, he will adapt over the extended period of several confrontation sessions and will begin to produce the clarity his commander demands. The empire builder will comply because he has concluded it is the only way to please and to avoid damaging, repeated public humiliation, the wall builder because his survival instinct has taken over and he sees compliance as the only defense against this threat, and the monkey doer because he habitually imitates the patterns of others and because compliance seems to offer the path of least resistance.

Finally, the commander himself must serve as a paragon of completeness, conciseness, and clarity in his own communications and must ruthlessly edit his own and the staff's written and oral communications. A thorough refresher in effective speaking and writing is the first step, followed by constant war against the hallmarks of bureaucratise: passive constructions, antecedent-less pronouns, vague qualifiers, jargon and technical terms. Every lapse into bureaucratise must be caught and corrected, for the bureaucratise speaker will automatically read toleration as approval, and every success he achieves, no matter how insignificant, is an indication to him that his verbal convolutions are achieving their intended purpose.

that allow the organization to survive (Glueck, 1978).

Clearly then, a process is needed which can counteract or change this modus operandi and achieve a **better fit**, a better balance, between the mission (the **technological**, procedural aspects of an organization) and the people (the **social** and human component of an organization). Another undebatable viewpoint suggests that the primary task of a leader is to get things done through people. However, today's Army leaders, operating in a complex and technologically sophisticated environment, must also be able to obtain optimum output from intricate and increasingly costly equipment and weapons systems. This is no small task when it is realized that achieving optimum output from technology may reduce the effectiveness of the social or people component and vice versa (Cherns, 1976). A process which can optimize both of these components and achieve a better balance between the two can be found in the concept of **Socio-Technical Systems (STS)**, applied in a military setting.

Herein lies a motto that the Army leadership can aspire and practice: "**Mission First—People Always**," again implying a distinct balance between the two. This motto became reality in an Army transportation company through the use of STS intervention, proving that it is possible to achieve this balance in a military environment. This concept and its successful application will be described in the remainder of this paper.

BACKGROUND

In mid-1979, the Concepts Development Directorate of the Army's Organizational Effectiveness Center and School (OECS), Fort Ord, California, initiated a research effort to identify other relevant consulting approaches with potential applications within the Army. This effort was simplified when the results of an independent internal evaluation became available, whose findings recommended that OECS explore the feasibility of the STS approach (Trist and Bamforth, 1951) and examine other consulting approaches that produce more enduring changes within organizations.

Following a thorough review of available literature on STS, it was subsequently defined as: "**Interventions, based on organizational development techniques, that typically involve the restructuring of work methods, rearrangements of technology, or the redesign of organizational social structures, with the objective of optimizing the relationship between the social or human systems of the organization and technology used by the organization to produce output. When the systems are arranged optimally, the organization runs more smoothly than when they are not; output is higher; employee's needs are better satisfied; and the organization remains adaptable to change**" (Pasmore and Sherwood, 1978, p. 3).

Supporting the probable value of the STS approach within the military, and particularly the

Army, was a growing body of evidence from the Air Force and Navy (Herzberg, 1977; Umstot, 1980). These accounts explored the potential benefits of job enrichment within the military and indicated that some adaptations of the STS approach could be applied within Department of Defense agencies.

Armed with this information, the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, in coordination with OECS, initiated research in November 1979 to explore the feasibility of the STS approach with the U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR). Shortly after this research began, the Army Organizational Effectiveness (OE) program managers were briefed regarding the basic tenets of the STS methodology and possible targets of opportunity within the Army. The enthusiastic response that followed served as a catalyst which led to a STS conference hosted by OECS in February 1980.

Selected OE consultants and their commanders attended this conference, culminating in the formulation of plans for several STS redesign operations. These additional "experimental operations" were deemed desirable because the USAREUR research was confined to a facility with an automated data processing mission, so it was believed additional information would be needed to fully explore STS applications within units with a more typical "field" mission. The transportation company described herein fulfilled this requirement.

SETTING

The transportation company selected for this experimental operation is part of a large Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) organization whose mission and purpose are depicted in Figure I. The company is one of five companies, all with

MISSION OF MAJOR COMMAND

Conduct scientific field experimentation to provide high resolution, accurate data, collected in an operational environment necessary for the improvement of combat effectiveness.


Figure I

different missions, in a brigade level subcommand commanded by an Army colonel. The unit is situated in a remote, austere Army post in central California. The mission and structure (Figures II and III) of transportation company were similar to those encountered within Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) units. Thus the findings derived from this operation could be generalized or

MISSION OF TRANSPORTATION COMPANY

Provide vehicles for movement of personnel and general cargo by motor transportation in support of experimentation.



Figure II



assistance. Once this external consultant had been identified, the newly formed consulting team proceeded to develop a tentative consulting strategy, using the major elements of a strategy graphically presented in Figure V¹ as a starting point. This initial strategy was later revised to meet and adapt to the ground situation (Figure VI) and will be used from now on to describe the intervention.

After gaining the new commander's approval, a reconnaissance (Step 2, Figure VI) of the organization was seen as a necessary starting place. During this step of the operation, a few randomly selected individuals (junior enlisted through officer) within the organization would be interviewed and their general perceptions of transportation company's efficiency and driver utilization would be solicited. Randomly selected customers of transportation company's services would also be interviewed in an attempt to get a better picture of how the services were contributing to the command-wide mission and to obtain their appraisal of perceived problem areas within the company. The OE consultants believed the information gathered during this phase would: (1) help confirm or deny the speculated need for some type of STS redesign; (2) provide an indication of the command's receptiveness to a redesign effort; and, (3) assist in formulating strategies to be used during the social and technical system analysis—assuming the project continued.

If the new commander decided to proceed with the STS effort, the next step would be to identify and select diagonal task force members (Step 3, Figure VI). This group of 10-12 people would be used to gather data, explore problems, brainstorm solutions, and evaluate proposed redesign recommendations which would be made during subsequent phases of the operation. The first departure from the original strategy occurred at this point. The OE consultants, because of the relatively small size of the company, favored a **diagonal slice task force** that would include members from various work teams within the company and fairly represent all grade structures (junior enlisted through officer). Discarded was the original plan (which would have unnecessarily taxed the limited resources of the company) to create both a core group task force and a management steering committee, both of which are found in a typical STS strategy.



and higher levels of command. As such, the second deviation from the planned strategy was made. The detailed *internal* analysis via the technical system variance matrix was dropped in favor of a more general, trend analysis, focusing on *external* practices and procedures which impacted on the company. Officers and NCO's of the company were also briefed and their acceptance and support (albeit low) gained. With this in mind the consultants and the commander made the decision to continue with the operation until its conclusion.

DIAGONAL TASK FORCE AND SOCIAL-TECHNICAL ANALYSIS

The creation and training of the diagonal task force were accomplished as planned, with the training spread out over a three week period. Ten individuals were selected, including a company officer (platoon leader) as the task force leader, along with representatives from the maintenance platoon, operations section, and NCO's and enlisted personnel from the truck platoons.

The task force (1) aided in getting a perspective from each level in the company; (2) actively demonstrated direct involvement of company personnel in the change process; (3) canvassed greater numbers (80% of the company were interviewed) than would have been possible had the consultants worked alone; and (4) freed the consultants to concentrate their efforts on the external environment of the company. These contributions proved invaluable to the consultants and the final outcome of the STS operation. However, the perceived *involvement of company personnel in the change process*, more than any other factor, facilitated the acceptance of the final redesign recommendations.

ANALYSIS AND TRENDS

The results of the joint analysis of the social and technical systems are shown in Figure VII. Immediately evident are the systemic, externally caused problems the company faced. For example, the command policy of assigning a driver and a vehicle to individuals involved in conducting experiments led to the problem of widespread underemployment and driver misuse. For instance, a typical commitment day for a driver was 9½ hours long; however, only an average of 3 hours was actually spent driving or maintaining the vehicle. The remaining 6 hours were usually totally unproductive, with the drivers either sleeping or doing absolutely nothing meaningful. Other incidents included drivers who were requested for 0530 show times, but were not used until 0800 and sometimes as late as 0930.

Some drivers were used to make personal and unofficial trips, such as forages to the Post Exchange or snack bar, or drive officers and NCO's between buildings no more than 150—200 meters apart. Other specific examples were directly observed and collected; however, those mentioned here are indicative of why morale and job satisfaction were low to non-existent.

RESOLUTION AND RECOMMENDED ACTIONS

Two avenues of attack were available to the consultants to overcome the major problem areas highlighted in Figure VII. The first was to address each problem individually and hope that this process will eventually resolve the "big systemic" problem. The second was to **redesign the organization** and its way of doing business. The choice between the two options, keeping in mind the definition of the STS concept, is obvious. Subsequently seven redesign recommendations were made, all of which were adopted and implemented.

The first of these recommendations was to eliminate the policy of having an assigned driver and vehicle dedicated to selected officers and NCO's involved in conducting various experiments. This entailed that these officers and NCO's, who previously enjoyed the ease and luxury of being picked up, driven, and deposited at their offices, to now drive their own vehicles. However, the command policy at that time required the user-driver to pick up a vehicle in person at the motor pool and perform all preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS) on the vehicle (before, during and after use)—tasks which consumed a significant amount of time and effort. For these and other reasons, one of which was the near total absence of drivers using the user-driver program, the consultants knew that this option, left as it was, would be highly unpalatable for the individuals involved and would be resisted quite strongly. Another alternative means of transportation was obviously required; one that would be more acceptable to the user-drivers who up until that time had, for all practical purposes, their own chauffeur. Another built-in incentive, albeit negative, could not be overlooked—those who choose not to use the user-driver vehicles had the option of walking.

Figure VII
JOINT ANALYSIS
Problem Trends

SOCIAL SYSTEM

- Inexperienced first-line supervisors
- Widespread underemployment of drivers
- Low morale and job satisfaction
- Misuse of drivers and vehicles
- Fragmented and inconsistent flow of information
- Lack of personnel accountability
- Unclear reward system
- Conflict between line units and maintenance unit

TECHNICAL SYSTEM

- Sub-standard operator maintenance
- Ineffective user-driver program
- Unavailability of parts
- Unavailability of reference material
- Crisis management modus operandi
- Mission execution externally dictated
- Low proficiency in technical tasks